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The defining difference between weapon systems of today
and those of twenty years ago amounts to a single work,
software. Computer software, utilized in embedded computer
systems, enabled the United States to maintain technological
superiority over the numerically superior and once formidable
Warsaw Pact and Soviet Armed Forces during the last two
decades of the Cold War.
Although this omnipotent force no longer exists, there is
still a threat from a multitude of potential enemies. The
uncertainty and potential instability in such areas as
Southwest Asia and the Commonwealth of Independent States
foster a Continuing need for these high-tech systems. Review
of the revised DoD doctrine, commensurate with the current
down-sizing of the military and future programs, clearly
demonstrates that the need for enhanced system performance
utilizing highly sophisticated and extremely expensive
embedded computer systems will continue to grow. In 1970, the
Army inventory contained only three automated weapon systems.
By 1980, there were 91. Today, the Army is supporting or
developing more than 250 distinct automated weapon systems.
[Ref. l:p. 27] As shown in Figure 1-1, this trend should
continue.



















Source: [Ref. l:p. 26]
This technological sophistication is not cheap. In Fiscal
Year (FY) 1980, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) spent
over $3 billion on software. [Ref. 2:p. 19] Most estimates
place DOD expenditure for software acquisition during Fiscal
Year 1993 in excess of $30 billion. [Ref. 2:p. 19] This
represents an approximate growth rate of 12% per year. [Ref.
3:p. 124]
Since 1985 (FY 1986) , the budget has contracted to a point
where the FY 1993 budget recommended by President Bush
provides $63.6 billion for the U.S. Army, a 28% reduction in
buying power over FY 90 (as measured in FY 92 constant
dollars). [Ref. 4:p. 74] The exponential growth in both the
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number of automated battlefield systems and their associated
cost has lead to wide discrepancies between the funding
required and the funding available for development and
fielding of new systems. [Ref. l:p. 29]
The annual life cycle cost of Army mission-critical
embedded software systems is at present in excess of $9
billion, with approximately 30% dedicated to system develop-








Fewer defense dollars, increasing numbers of programs, and
rising costs for state-of-the-art weapon systems demand
critical analysis of every dollar spent by Army Program
Managers to ensure maximum utility and return on investment.
Compounding the financial problem is a decline in software
productivity at a time when current software projects are
steadily increasing in size, scope, and complexity. [Ref.
5: p. 3] This decline in productivity is due in part to the
aforementioned increase in software system complexity and, in
part, to the general decline in the number of available
software engineering personnel in the Army, other DoD
agencies, and the civilian software development community
[Ref. 5:p. 14].
The DoD, in conjunction with a host of corporations
involved in developing and utilizing mission-critical program
software, has been studying a multitude of proposals to reduce
development costs and optimize productivity. These proposals
include technical as-well-as non-technical approaches to the
problem. Although all areas under scrutiny show potential,
the most promising rewards are thought to lie in the area of
improved program management and utilization of available
resources. In this regard, the application of software-reuse
technologies bears great potential value.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the problems
inherent with the application of software-reuse technologies
at the DoD Program Office level. The thesis will explore the
key aspects of current DoD software-reuse technologies and the
principal management inhibitors or barriers to implementation.
Additionally, this thesis will query major-systems program
managers on their views and observations with respect to
software-reuse and its potential or actual effects on their
4
programs. Finally, this thesis will examine the most
promising approaches to resolving the problems associated with
implementation of software-reuse within the major-systems
Program Offices.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In accordance with the purpose of this thesis, the primary
research question is:
What are the primary problems involved with the proposed
software technologies reuse process from the perspective of a
Program Office and how might these problems be addressed?
To effectively address this question, the following
subsidiary research questions must be answered:




What are the principal management inhibitors or barriers
to software-reuse?
3. How do Army major-system program offices view the
software-reuse program?
4. What are the most promising approaches to resolving the
problems associated with implementation of the software-
reuse program?
D. SCOPE
This thesis will limit its scope to the non-technical
aspects of software-reuse. Specifically, the potential
benefits gained from the implementation of a DoD software-
reuse policy governing the use of reuse tools and techniques
in the software development portion of major-system program
management. It will address only those reuse technologies
5
currently recognized by DOD and recommended by research groups
and advocates for effective, cost-efficient software
development. The thesis research will not explore software-
reuse beyond the development phase of the program life cycle.
E. METHODOLOGY
The research foundations of this thesis are the documented
efforts of the DOD Systems Acquisition and Software-reuse
Workshops conducted by the Director of Defense Information of
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Interna-
tional Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Software
Seminars and Symposiums, and a host of other Government and
civilian conferences and proceedings. Interviews of various
personnel within the Army Acquisition Corps Program Office
structure provided valuable and otherwise nonobtainable
research material. Government reports, publications, minutes
and proceedings of current ad hoc software-reuse workshop
committee meeting and efforts to develop and implement a reuse
process provided additional information.
F. ORGANIZATION
This thesis documents current efforts to implement
software-reuse into major-systems program development, and
attempts to identify and address potential managerial problems
associated with reuse at the Program Office level.
Chapter II reviews the need for and functional nature of
software-reuse, some current aspects of DoD software-reuse
programs, and evaluates its current status. Chapter III
explains the process used to select program software
development methods and the Program Manager's ability to
affect software development. The chapter then presents and
analyzes inhibitors and barriers to implementing software-
reuse. Chapter IV examines the views and observations of
Program Office personnel. Chapter V analyzes potential
methods for overcoming the problems identified in Chapter III.
Finally, Chapter VI answers the research questions, draws
general conclusions and provides recommendations for areas of
further study.
II. SOFTWARE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
A. SOFTWARE: DEFINITION AND NEED
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines software
as "the set of instructions and data that are executed in a
computer. This definition includes only the executable form
of the instructions and data." [Ref. 6: pp. 3-5] By
definition, software is an intangible, without mass, volume,
or other physical properties. It is at best conceptual,
lending itself to the nature of an art more than science or
engineering. Yet, it is one of the most critical resources of
the Department of Defense for the production of today's
sophisticated, high-technology weapon systems. The DoD
considers weapon systems software to be on the "critical path"
of system development. [Ref. 6: p. 1-1]
Software is integrated into virtually every weapon system,
either as an integral component, such as an embedded system,
or as some sort of training or maintenance complement to the
primary system. Today, software has taken the place of many
hardware functions in weapon systems. This has become a mater
of practical application, allowing system designers much more
latitude than previously permitted with strictly hardware or
hardwired solutions to advanced problems. Software has
allowed weapon systems designers to take advantage of
capabilities here-to-fore thought unattainable because of the
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physical limitations of man and machine. Software has proven
to be inherently more flexible than hardware, and allows both
minute performance upgrades and sweeping changes to funda-
mental weapon systems operations without major computer
hardware changes or structural reconfiguration. Such relative
ease of change in abilities has proven to be an economic boon
to the system upgrade concept. It has proven to be far
cheaper and generally quicker to upgrade capability through
software changes than system redesign, refit, or rebuild. In
addition, it is orders of magnitude cheaper to upgrade than
produce new, more advanced weapon systems, as demonstrated by
the U.S. Air Force's decision to upgrade existing F16s vice
developing a new, multipurpose fighter [Ref. 7:p. A5].
Software upgrading has become increasingly important in
this time of similarly rapid evolution of Threat 1 weapon
systems' computer technology and associated upgrading.
Software has become so prominent in U.S. weapon system design
that it has proven to be an influencing factor on overall
system design about 50 percent of the time since the early
1970's. [Ref. 6:Ch. 2] However, software as a major component
of computerized systems is a relatively new development. It
was not until the late 1960 's that hardware and software
1Threat refers to the now defunct Soviet Union, its
successor, the Commonwealth of Independent States, various
client states of the old Soviet Union, and other potential
belligerents.
components of digital systems began to progress along separate
paths.
Hardware development has been revolutionary, producing
faster, ever more advanced and capable machines. This
revolution has been brought about by the marriage of the
silicon chip and electrical engineering, and resulted in such
things as Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC)
.
Today's computers have exponentially increased capability over
the earliest practically applied systems. Consequently, this
revolutionary process has gone from 16 bit architecture
utilizing 60,000 word memories to 32 bit architecture
utilizing 5.0+ million word memories. [Ref. 5:p. 2]
Paralleling the hardware revolution has been software
evolution. Although a slow process, often being equated to a
"black art," software evolution has produced much. [Ref. 8: p.
31] In the roughly forty years since the introduction of the
first digital system, software evolution has produced hundreds
of languages spanning four levels of complexity2 , multitudes
of design and instruction set architectures, and a plethora of
development techniques and styles.
Because of the seemingly unlimited ability of computer
resources to expand on physical limitations, these resources,
especially software, are experiencing voracious demand from
2Levels of complexity for computer languages are
categorized into four groups: machine languages, assembly
languages, higher order languages, and application generators.
[Ref. 6:pp. 3-10] Each language meets a specific need at a
particular level of programming (see Appendix B)
.
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Government and industry. The fact is that tomorrow's weapon
systems will be complex technological marvels filled with
computer hardware and software.
B. SOFTWARE: PROBLEMS
The sophistication and approach to mission critical
computer software design and development provide ample
opportunity for problems to arise. These problems take many
forms, but generally can be seen to parallel many of the
problems that appear in hardware development. Some of the
more relevant are as follows:
1. Complexity
As the demand for software grows and the applications
expand, the level of complexity necessarily goes up. As
program capability expands, especially with regard to real-
time systems, the number of source lines of code (SLOC)
becomes enormous. Because of the "building-block structure
and mind-boggling interrelationships in modern software," such
as the number of "do loops" and "go to" instruction sets
involved in simple evaluation algorithms, arithmetic software
progression can quickly become geometrically complex. [Ref.
8:p. 30] The ambiguous nature and poor decomposition of
software problems coupled with the predominant control of
projects by "hardware people3 " expands and aggravates the
3Hardware as opposed to software people. The term
indicates background discipline with respect to the system,
such as electrical engineering, aeronautical engineering, etc.
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complexity problem. [Ref. 7: p. 4] Technological advances in
hardware introduce new requirements into the process,
requiring sometimes substantial changes to earlier software
packages or modules. Finally, expansion of mission critical
computer resources software programs creates a need for
substantially larger and more complex associated support
systems. [Ref. 6:Ch. 1]
2 . Cost
Once, hardware was the "big-ticket" item in terms of
weapon system cost. However, over the last two decades, that
trend has changed. Today, software accounts for up to 80
percent of the cost of a weapon system (see Figure 2-1) . Much
of this growth can be attributed to the recognition and
inclusion of the costs associated with the entire software
system's life cycle. Other sources of cost growth include
poorly formulated initial software requirements, upgrading and
changing requirements after initiation of the development
phase [Ref. 9:p. 50], and otherwise just poor software design
methodologies used by some software developers. [Ref. 6:Ch.
1] Add to this the serious decline in real defense spending
allocations and appropriations budgeted over the next five
years, and the "cost" factor takes on linchpin significance.
[Ref. 3:p. 74]
3 . Productivity
Nearly every study conducted during the last ten years
has given warning to an imminent shortage of software develop-
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ment personnel. The current growth rate of the number of
software-producing personnel is about 4 percent per year. (Kf.
10:p. 31] Matched against the estimated 12 percent annual
growth rate in demand for software and the increasing
complexity of today's programs, SLOC productivity is dropping
dramatically. As the level of difficulty in "producing lines
of integrated, tested, and documented code per month"
traverses from "'easy' (precedented) tasks" to complex
software tasks, the production rate per programmer drops from




Source: [Ref. 2:Ch. 2]
Although the number of programmers is growing, the
productivity per programmer is falling. The smaller (relative
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to demand) work force and increasing demand will trigger
economic responses, driving up the price of labor and the
related cost per SLOC. The "bottom line" is simple — the
future portends a dearth of mission critical software.
4. Reliability
Software reliability can be explained simply as the
probability that a software component, module, or program will
work in a satisfactory manner for a given period of time and
under specified conditions [Ref. 12:p. 347]. Reliability is
a function of system requirements and program design, and
depends on accuracy, consistency, complexity, error tolerance,
and modularity. [Ref. 13 :p. 229] Predictably, as program
size and complexity have gone up, reliability has dropped.
Most programs developed to date have not worked as initially
designed, and most have never lived up to requirements and
design specifications once "repaired." [Ref. 8: pp. 29-30]
Software reliability has a direct impact on program cost,
often accounting for cost overruns of 50 to 100 percent of
total program budget. [Ref. 6: p. 1-1]
5. Quality
Software quality is essentially the absence of
spoilage, or that substantial effort (55 percent of the total
lifetime cost of the average system) dedicated to diagnosis
and removal of faults introduced during the development
process. [Ref. 14:pp. 198-200] When eradicating design
errors it is necessary to figure both a lost time cost and a
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lost productivity cost. The lost time cost consists of the
manhour cost of repairing the unfruitful labors of previously
expended and expensed manhours and the utility cost of not
having a fielded system. The lost productivity cost, while
only an estimation, must be extremely high given that efforts
to repair one piece of software must necessarily pull
resources away from the production of new software, aiding in
the overall decline in software productivity.
C. SOFTWARE: SOLUTIONS
Recognizing that no single program, project, or group can
"fix" all of the problems listed in Section B, the Army, in
conjunction with the DoD, has approached these problems with
various solutions. Some of the more important or influential
are as follows:
1. Studies, councils, and working groups
The DoD has engaged in and contracted for a number of
studies and working groups to address the problems and
concerns involved with mission critical computer resources
development and acquisition. [Ref. 15 :p. 1] Efforts have
been directed at almost every aspect of these problems. They
have involved studies of weapon systems' software management,
cost-schedule strategies for software intensive project
development, the software development environment, and
technology transfer. [Ref. 16: pp. 4-5] Additional areas of
focus have been on issues involving software reuse tech-
nologies, including the Software Technology for Adaptable,
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Reliable Systems (STARS) Program. [Ref. 17: p. 1] There have
also been policy and standardization attempts made to address
problems within the segment of the Defense Industrial Base
responsible for most DoD software production. [Ref. 18] And
finally, a great variety of joint Service attempts have been
made to apply standardization to shared common concerns such
as avionics hardware and software and command and control
communications systems. [Ref. 6:Chs. 3-4] [Ref. 19 :p. A-22]
Most notable of these efforts has been the great
proliferation of permanent panels, working groups and software
study organizations. Also of note has been the number of non-
DoD organizations and civilian companies which have also
formed to advance computer technology, regardless of the
apparent beneficiary of their findings and proposals. Some of
the more prominent and important of these organizations and
companies are:
(a) Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
(b) Software Engineering Institute (SEI)
(c) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
(d) Joint Logistics Commanders (JLC) Joint Policy
Coordinating Group on Computer Resource Management
(e) Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
(f) National Security Industrial Association (NISA)
(g) Joint Integrated Avionics Working Group (JIAWG)
(h) U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM)
Center for Software Engineering
(i) NASA Langley Research Center
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2. Standardization
Most of the problems listed in Section 2 are the
result of the uncontrolled proliferation of the number of
weapon systems utilizing computer applications that occurred
from the late 1960 's through the 1970' s and into the early
1980 's. [Ref. 6:Ch. 4] This multiplicity of problems posed
by the non-standardization of supposedly interoperable systems
reached a peak in the late 1970' s and prompted the DoD to
focus on standardization
,
particularly with regard to embedded
systems. Through the efforts of most of the groups listed
above, and especially the agenda carried by the Joint
Logistics Commanders and DARPA, significant advancements have
been made in both hardware and software standardization.
To this end, the DoD has standardized nearly every
aspect of software and hardware development, production, and
procurement through issuance of specific policy and guidance.
The primary governing directives is DoD Directive 7920.1, Life
Cycle Management of Automated Information Systems [Ref. 21].
Three areas have received the primary focus:
(a) Higher Order Languages (HOLs) . As mentioned earlier,
there were hundreds of languages being used within the
DoD by the late 1970 's. In order to inject some much
needed interoperability into embedded systems and limit
geometrically expanding software support costs, the DoD
severely limited the number of acceptable HOLs and
designated Ada as the preferred language. [Ref. 6:Ch.
4]
While DoD Directive 3405.1, Computer Programming
Language Policy, lists and provides guidance for
selection of the approved DoD programming languages
[Ref. 22], DoD Directive 5000.2, provides explicitly
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for the use of Ada as the single, common, HOL in new
computer embedded weapon systems [Ref. 20:p. 6-D-3].
(b) Software Development. Technological advances and
language standardization aided software development
immensely. The insertion of Very High Speed Integrated
Circuits (VHSIC) has provided much greater potential
application of the acceptable software languages, to
exploit this potential while maintaining control of
resources, the DoD has implemented DoD-STD-2167A,
Defense System Software Development, and DoD-STD-2168,
Defense System Software Quality Program, to apply
standardization and a system engineering approach to
software development. [Ref. 23] Additional efforts,
such as the STARS program and liaisons between
technical and academic institutions have aimed at
fostering technology application and transfer [Ref.
6:Chs. 4 - 5]
.
(c) Computer Hardware. Because the revolutionary
developments in mission critical computing hardware
took as many directions as there were software
languages, the DoD expended considerable effort
standardizing the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)
.
This standardized the "Internal and fixed repertoire of
Instructions" that compose the required roadmap
describing the hardware/software interface. [Ref.
5:Ch. 3] Although an ISA is currently established as
MIL-STD-1750AA , the tremendous pace at which computer
technology is moving forward has rendered this
architecture obsolete. [Ref. 26: pp. 36-37]
DoD attempts at regulating the computer development
environment through directives, regulations, and standardiza-
tion have successfully surmounted, or at least curtailed, many
of the problems described in Section 2 . Often the proposed
solutions for a particular problem produce "bleed-over" into
other problem areas, directly or indirectly complimenting
4The currently established MIL-STD-1705A, 16-bit
architecture, is generally utilized in airborne applications
and is probably the most widely used system. [Ref. 6:Ch. 3]
However, other standard-ized 8-bit and 16-bit architectures do
exist within certain communications applications. [Ref. 24]
[Ref. 25]
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other efforts to address problems in any given area. For
example, the standardization and implementation of MIL-STD-
1705A architecture fostered the development of the Ada HOL,
which in turn has enabled the DoD to more effectively
structure the software development environment. Obviously, as
each problem exerts some influence on the other problems
individually and collectively, so too do the proposed and
potential solutions.
This iterative process of problem evaluation, solution
application, problem evaluation, is slow, ponderously expen-
sive, and yields only marginal results. Recognizing the need
to optimize efforts to solve mission critical computer
resources problems, the DoD and its many supporting and allied
agencies have attempted to utilize all the tools available to
maximize computer resource potential. One of the most viable
solutions, widely ranging in terms of impact and potentially
lucrative in terms of results, is application of software
reuse technologies and methodologies. The potential feasi-
bility of this has been borne out by studies showing as much
as 4 to 60 percent of the software written for one system is
virtually identical to previously written code for a similar
system [Ref. 2:p. 20].
D. SOFTWARE REUSE: TECHNOLOGIES AND METHODS
DoD has settled on the definition of software reuse as
being any new application of an existing component to include
requirements, designs and specifications, and final source
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code, as well as corresponding test plans, procedures,
results, and supporting documentation, generated during any
stage of a system's development. [Ref. 27] This definition
opens the scope of software reuse to much wider application
than the DoD definition of software (Section A) would suggest.
This definition facilitates implementation of reuse not only
from the technical aspect, but the all too long ignored non-
technical aspect.
While the concept of software reuse has been around since
the very first digital computers, reusability did not become
a major topic within the computer industry until 1983 [Ref.
28 :p. 372], even though the DoD had initiated efforts through
the JLC to implement reusability as early as 1981 [Ref. 15: Tab
E] . Although 1983 marked the beginning of real efforts, from
a technological perspective, to develop the mechanics of
software reuse, only in the last three to four years has real
interest been shown in examining and developing the non-
technical side of software reuse.
To understand the non-technical aspects of software, it is
first necessary to have at least a rudimentary knowledge of
the technical side of software reuse. The first step in
development of new software from existing software is domain
analysis. This is a process wherein preliminary requirements
for software parts are identified to fill common needs within
the specified domain. The process develops a preliminary
domain model and a classification scheme. Then, through the
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collection, organization, and analysis of the data, the model
is refined to identify common objects, structures, and
functions as candidates for reusable parts. [Ref. 29 :p. 1]
The domain analysis is independent of the type or application
of reuse. [Ref. 16: p. 5]
The second step requires a thorough cost analysis to
ensure there is a benefit to be gained through reuse. A
relatively simple formula has been developed by the JIAWG
based on the "first-cut" domain analysis and estimated
potential for reuse across the system domain. The formula and
process [Ref. 29:pp. 5-11] are as follows:
(1) Determine overall estimation of potential software
parts reusability. Base the estimation on high,
medium, and low ratings of software parts and areas,
with high being greater than 50 percent and low being
less than 30 percent reuse of products.
(2) Assumptions:
(a) Software parts (e.g., all documentation, design
representations) are reused.
(b) There will be some cost associated with
developing reusable software to current project
standards
.
(c) The more times a software part is reused, the
lower the cost of that part.
(3) Let:
B = relative cost of locating and integrating reusable
software parts (0 < B < 1)
.
R = proportion of reused software parts (proportion of
new software parts = 1 - R) .
E = cost to develop reusable software parts relative
to non-reusable parts [includes development of
library and standards (E > 1) .
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C = relative cost of developing the total project
software parts (break even point: C = 1) .
N = estimated number of times code must be reused to
break even [N = E / (1 - B)].
( 4 ) Then
:
C = (1-R) *1+R* (B + E/N) or
C = (B + E/N-l) * R + 1
As stated earlier, this is a rather simplistic approach.
However, the point is made graphically (based on a "best case
estimate" in which "software parts up to and including code
are reused" [Ref. 29 :p. 11]) in Figures 2-2 and 2-3. Figure
2-2 demonstrates the percentage of cost savings for different
values of B. The lower the value of B, the more that is
saved. Figure 2-3 demonstrates potential cost savings based
on various values of reusable software parts. In this graph,
the relative cost of developing reusable software parts is
1.25 and the relative cost to reuse it is 1.0. [Ref. 29:pp.
9-11] These graphs demonstrate the potential for reuse.
However, while on the surface this would appear to be a simple
matter, the potential technical difficulties of utilizing
still immature techniques for reuse can quickly overwhelm any
cost advantages. Obviously, thorough domain analysis becomes
even more crucial.
Should both steps prove advantageous, however, there are
two different approaches to successful implementation of
software reuse. The two approaches are based on either "the
22
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origin and packaging of the component, or the granularity of
components that are reused." [Ref. 16:p. 5].
1. Origin and packaging of components refers to the
system commonly detailed as the software library or repository
system. The library system can be founded on a variety of
precepts, from libraries containing only components within
certain domains (generally indicating intense domain analysis)
to libraries stocked with individual coded lines of software
to libraries consisting of combinations of reusable data,
architectures, designs, software modules or entire programs.
[Ref. 28:pp. 372-376] The retrieval system works much like
any other resource library, with indices and cross references
based on such things as keywords, domain types, architectures,
etc. The repositories, on the other hand, do not generally
classify and catalog software parts. They generally "have no
order or commonality and usually no controls are exercised."
[Ref. 29:p. 6]
2. Granularity of the components, such as code reuse,
specification reuse, generation of software, and reuse based
on generic architectures, is the other way to define reuse.
This involves taking actual code, specifications, architec-
ture, etc.
,
from one application and using it "as is" or
modified for use in another application, regardless of system
design. [Ref. 16:p. 6]
The choice of approach to reuse then depends on such
variables as the domain, its boundaries and level of
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technological sophistication, expertise in the field and
mission of the system. [Ref. 16:p. 6]
E. SOFTWARE REUSE: CURRENT APPLICATIONS
There are currently several on-going software reuse
efforts, both within the Federal Government and by industrial
programs supporting the Federal Government. Because of
software reuse 's need to access preexisting software parts,
efforts limited to a particular military Service, university
or industry software engineering community tend to limit
potential . These current programs encompass the efforts of
the DoD, National Aeronautic Space Administration (NASA)
,
several universities, and a number of software engineering
contractors. Some of the more significant software programs
involving reuse follow:
1. Software Technology for Adaptable, Reliable Systems
(STARS) Program. STARS is a major software enhancement
program directed by DARPA. The program, initiated in the
early 1980's, with the mandate to build on the achievements of
the Ada program, is aimed at improving the software
development and support environment. [Ref. 30 :p. 10] It was
designed to cover both technical and management aspects during
all phases of the software life cycle, and is part of a joint
effort with the very high speed integrated circuit (VHSIC)
program to improve management practices, software acquisition
strategies, technologies, and personnel skill levels. [Ref.
31] The STARS program is "trying to increase software
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productivity, reliability, and quality by integrating support
for software processes and reuse concepts." [Ref. 16 :p. 5]
Currently, STARS is sponsoring two programs focused
specifically on reuse:
(a) ASSET. Asset Source for Software Engineering Tech-
niques. This program is focused on developing and
exploiting technologies to permit effective interoper-
ability between reuse libraries. [Ref. 16 :p. 5]
(b) CARDS. Central Archive for Reusable Defense Software.
The CARDS program is tasked with "creating a knowledge
blueprint" specifying "how to build domain-specific
reuse libraries." [Ref. 16:p. 5]
2. There are several software library programs which are
classified as "origin of component: programs:
(a) RAPID. Reusable Ada Products for Information System
Development. This is an Army program with objectives
to promote "reuse" of Ada software components and
reduce systems development and maintenance costs. It
utilizes an automated system for identification,
analysis, storage, and retrieval of Ada reusable
software components, including source code, require-
ments, and design criteria. [Ref. 32:pp. 31-32]
(b) CAMP. Common Ada Missile Packages. The CAMP program
is sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Armament Laboratory
and is operated by McDonnell Douglas Missile Systems
Company. It serves the military, NASA, and civilian
contractors developing missile systems software. This
reuse program consists of taxonomy classified software
packages aimed at applications in a real-time domain.
[Ref. 33]
(c) AFATDS. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System.
The AFATDS program provides a library system within the
Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) . This
library is designed to provide reusable Ada software
components for fire support applications and to have
interface commonality with the other battlefield
functional areas (BFAs) 5 within ATCCS.
5The five Battlefield Functional Areas are Maneuver
Control, Fire Support, Air Defense, Intelligence and
Electronic Warfare, and Combat Service Support.
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(d) Eli. Eli is a NASA sponsored library facility. It is
a "knowledge-based reusable software synthesis system"
designed to classify, store, and retrieve software as
well as create an environment that "emphasizes,
encourages, and supports reuse." [Ref. 34 :p. 17] It
is intended to be part of a system incorporating the
software development tool CASE (Computer-Aided Software
Engineering system) and the Architecture Design and
Assessment System (ADAS) with the goal of automated
system development. [Ref. 35: p. 65]
(e) AdaNet. This is a project under the direction of the
NASA Johnson Space Center. The AdaNet objective is to
develop an electronic distribution network for software
engineering information, parts, and code. The program
serves the U.S. Government and private industry working
on software development in manufacturing and adminis-
trative areas. [Ref. 36]
3. There are far fewer programs which utilize the
"granularity of components" approach to software reuse.
However, one of the largest and most complex projects is the
Army's ATCCS project (see D.2(c) above). The Army Tactical
Command and Control System seeks to tie together command and
control systems being developed by the five BFAs. Being
developed from commercial non-developmental (NDI) computer
systems and commercial and Governmental off-the-shelf software
(COTS and GOTS) , ATCCS employs specification reuse at the "A",
"B", and "C-5" specification level. Additionally, the program
utilizes a generic architecture to provide high-level design
for related applications within the five BFAs, and provides




Obviously, a great deal of time and effort are being spent
on reuse application. The process is extremely complex,
blurring the boundaries between the technical and managerial
aspects of program development. It requires the software
developer to consider the managerial aspects of cost and
development time while the program manager must consider reuse
methodologies and available resource pools. It requires long
term investment and provides dubious returns, especially in
the short run. However, it appears to be one of the best
answers to the software program issues of increasing demand
and productivity deficit, short of halting technological
advance. This chapter addressed software definition,
problems, solutions and reuse technologies. The next chapter
will focus on program management software development methods
and the barriers to implementing a software reuse program.
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III. SOFTWARE REUSE
A. THE PM AND SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
Regardless of the type of software needed for a system,
the eventual product can be arrived at only after the
development process has run its course. The program manager
will determine the direction and ultimate end of that course.
It is within the venue of the program manager to influence
nearly every aspect of software development.
The PM's level of technological sophistication, comprehen-
sion of software, software architecture, and software
engineering concepts, and overall familiarity with the soft-
ware development process, will in large part, determine the
shape of the final product. The complexity and sophistication
of the final software product, whether embedded or not, will
be determined by the degree and depth of involvement displayed
by the PM.
This concept is very simple. The greater the PM's
knowledge of cost estimation, system requirements, software
architecture, design, engineering, and test and evaluation,
the more he is able to influence the software development
process. The less the PM knows, the more likely he will rely
on subordinates or outside contractors to make critical
decisions and influence development. Therefore, the final
product will be the result of personal bias and preferences of
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either the PM or knowledgeable subordinates or contractors
tasked with software development or management. This can be
reflected in something as simple as the choice of an off-the-
shelf product such as SCO UNIX6 to be used as an operating
system with the Army's Tactical Command and Control System or
as complex as the embedded systems found in cruise missiles
utilizing satellite global positioning system navigation
programming. It is easy to understand that a developmental
program will be more susceptible to, and indeed be more
reflective of, PM influence than a COTS program.
B. THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
To understand the problems facing the Program Manager in
developing software, let alone attempting to incorporate
software reuse into the acquisition process, it is critical to
understand the product development cycled or process. Only
when this process is thoroughly understood can attempts at
schedule reduction and cost saving through reuse be attempted.
The development cycle or process for software is similar
to that used for hardware with only a few exceptions. One
difference is the idea that software development is only the
first part of the software life cycle, whereas the hardware
life cycle is generally acknowledged to begin after the
6SCO UNIX is typical of a commercial off-the-shelf host
operating system for standard applications programs. SCO is
the brand name and stands for Santa Cruz Operations while UNIX
is the type of system, much the same as MS (Microsoft Systems)
DOS.
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development process is completed. The most obvious difference
however, is the end product. Hardware development results in
the production or completion of some physical product which
performs a visible or measurable function. There is a
definitive end to the process, a tangible finality to the
development effort. For hardware, the end of the development
process marks the beginning of the production process.
Software on the other hand is more abstract in its end result.
There is no physical product, and performance can be judged
only after extensive testing. Production is merely a matter
of copying the final product to other disks for use in other
machines, or embedding the software onto silicon chips
integrated into the system. And because there is no physical
product, it can be difficult to determine a definitive
completion point. This often leads to distortion of the
programming as the project attempts to reach completion. 7 The
urge to "add"capabilities and enhancements after the develop-
ment phase has been initiated, combined with the complexity of
today's programs and difficulty in determining the end point
developing computer software is much like taking a trip
from point A to point B by following a road map. There are
several routes that can be taken — the direct route (straight
line) and any number of more circuitous routes. Even after
the journey starts, it is possible to veer off the most direct
route (for any number of reasons) and add miles to the trip.
The same concept applies to software. Although there is not
much in the way of a road map to follow, there are infinite
detours and "scenic routes" in the programming which provide
no added value to the product and may even complicate or delay
program completion.
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requires the software developer and program manager to
exercise close-hold management over the process.
Whether the final product is embedded application software
(generally the ultimate goal of the software acquisition
activity) , commercial off-the-shelf software bindings, or
development support, maintenance, and diagnostic software, the
program manager follows one of three development process
models. The conventional or "waterfall" software development
model is shown in Figure 3-1, and evolutionary offshoot is
presented in Figure 3-2, and finally the prototyping approach
is depicted in Figure 3-3.
The conventional software development model, commonly
referred to as the "waterfall" software development process
because of the way it is graphically presented, is the
baseline model. It is the system most often used to manage
DoD software development. To understand the evolutionary and
prototype development processes it is critical to understand
the waterfall method.
The steps in this standard software development process
are as follows: System Definition, Software Requirements
Definition, Preliminary Design, Detailed Design, Code and Unit






















































Figure 3-3. Prototyping Software Development Process
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1. System Definition
The first step actually happens prior to the start of
the development effort. It starts with the definition of
the system architecture. This is the allocation of system
requirements to either hardware or software components. Once
the decision is made as to which functions will be executed by
hardware and which will be executed by software, a parallel
effort of hardware and software definition, design, and
implementation is initiated. Although there are now two
separate development paths, the two must remain linked
together through cooperative effort to ensure successful
system integration is the final product. [Ref. 38 :p. 20]
2. Software Requirements Definition
This is the most important step in the entire
development process. Insufficient requirements identification
and definition create development errors which propagate
through the development process, to end in erroneous hardware
designs and software products which can be extremely expensive
and time consuming to correct (if they can be corrected at
all) . Therefore, this step which uses the System Specifica-
tion as a guide to establish the requirements for each
computer software configuration item, including software
inputs and outputs, interfaces, and controls, is crucial in
the development process.
As mentioned earlier, testing, based on the require-
ments, is the method used to determine if the product has
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reached completion and if it satisfies the system needs. The
testing criteria are based on the requirements definitions.
Consequently, it is possible to poorly define, incorrectly
develop, successfully test, and ultimately produce a product
that does not meet system specification.
It is often necessary to develop testing tools,
modules, and interfaces into individual modules concurrently
with the program software in order to be able to test the
final product. These testing tools add even greater potential
for error and unsuitable end product. Again, the importance
of correctly defining the requirements comes into focus.
3. Preliminary Design
This activity determines the overall software
structure. The software is partitioned into modules based on
the requirements identified in the software requirements
definition phase. The function (or functions) of each module
is then defined, as-well-as the relationships between modules.
The software executive functions which contribute the timing
and priority rules for the software structure are also defined
at this stage. To ensure the software requirements meet
hardware constraints, the timing and memory budget for the
software tasks and modules are also established during this
phase.
Currently, there are two types of software design
methods — functional development and design-oriented
development. Both engage in the decomposition of the system.
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One is based on the concept that each module represents a
major step in the overall process. The other is based upon
the concept that the behavior of an object, such as a disk
driver or video display, is characterized by the operations
involving or performed by or on that object, and the functions
it requires of other objects (such as the demands made of the
SCSI driver by an external peripheral) . [Ref . 38 :p. 22]
Again, as in many software engineering operations and
procedures, both these methods are hierarchical. They exist
as building blocks, with the smaller blocks of the lowest
level forming the larger blocks of the next higher level and
so on. Ultimately, the top-level modules can accomplish their
application or execution tasks with the culmination of all the
subtasks.
In its most effective form, the average software
module contains about 100 lines of source code and seldom
exceeds 200 lines. Each of the blocks or modules in the
hierarchical structure should generally contain more than two
but less than seven smaller blocks or submodules to maintain
an effective span-of-control over the function.
4. Detailed Design
Having broken down the overall program into manageable
modules in the previous phase, this step proceeds to detail
the design of each software unit module. The detail is
expressed to such a point that the coding sequence can be done
by someone other than the software designer. This requires
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that the detailing include the unit's function, inputs,
outputs, and memory and timing constraints, as-well-as the
logical, static, and dynamic relationships between modules.
It is critical, therefore, that the completed detailed design
include descriptions of all data to be processed and all
processes to be executed. Finally, this step generates the
module and system integration test specifications and
procedures
.
5. Code and Unit Testing
In this step, the detailed software design is
translated into the machine code of the target computer and,
when complete, tested to eliminate errors.
The coding process involves writing source code for
each software component or module in a Government approved
higher-order languages such as Ada. A compiler is then used
to translate the source code into object code.
As with the previous steps of the software development
model, the relative ease of completion and degree of success
of the coding phase depends directly on the software require-
ments and documentation produced in the earlier steps.
However, an even more crucial factor can affect the outcome of
the coding sequence at this point — the human factor.
Because each unit or module of higher-order code is written by
a human programmer, the greatest potential for errors in the
coding sequence comes from that programmer.
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The unit testing of the software generally detects
most of these coding errors, which are then corrected by the
programmer. Errors that go undetected during this phase will
usually turn up during the next step, software module
integration testing.
6. Integration Test
This step entails combining the small, manageable,
encoded modules into larger modules and testing the
integration to ensure compliance with system requirements.
Obviously the module integration must usually be based on the
functional capabilities demonstrated by groups of specific
units. The integration is done incrementally, with coded
units being added only after each assembled sub-module is
successfully tested.
Because the integration testing involves several coded
units, it can be extremely difficult to locate and isolate
faults or errors. Fault isolation and correction can be a
tedious, expensive, and time consuming business. The
importance of a well designed software test plan and test
description is clearly evident.
7. System Test
This is the final step in the actual development
process. This step demonstrates that the hardware works in
conjunction with the software to accomplish all system
functions. Successful completion of this step will result in
a finalized product ready for production.
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8 . Maintenance
The Maintenance portion of the developmental process
carries the software through the rest of its life cycle. If
properly executed, the previous steps result in a product that
is readily maintainable and thoroughly documented. It remains
only for the maintenance process to correct any residual
problems in the software, adapt the software to hardware or
operational environment changes, and enhance the software to
enhance performance or incorporate new functions. [Ref. 38: p.
25]
Although, this sounds relatively simple, the main-
tenance phase of the life cycle is actually a process in and
of itself. Software maintenance is the most costly step in
the overall process, as the life of the product can extend for
years.
It is possible for errors in the software to present
themselves long after the software has been released for use.
These problems can result form subtle changes or differences
in the host hardware, expansion of the intended application
environment, or interaction with other software. However, a
large number of these errors can be attributed to poorly
designed tests developed in parallel with the software.
Poorly designed and developed unit or module tests as-well-as
integration tests will plague software throughout its usable
life. The error correction process, as described previously,
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is a fairly straight forward (albeit difficult) matter of
fault isolation and program correction.
The process of inserting changes in the programming to
accommodate a changing operational environment or minor
hardware changes, however, is a small scale repetition of the
software development process. The new requirements are
identified and documented. The change (s) to meet the new
requirements must be designed within the parameters of the
existing software design. The design is then coded, debugged,
and tested as in previous steps. It is critical, given the
influences of changing requirements and the nature of
inserting new code into the existing program, that exacting
and deliberative testing be conducted to ensure the new code
does not adversely affect or impact the already existing code.
The only deviation from the original development model is the
addition of an end review at the completion of the change
process to ensure the new requirements are met and the
unchanged functions still operate correctly.
The other two methods mentioned previously are used in
cases where the waterfall method may not apply because of
difficulty in defining the software requirements fully at the
beginning of the process; significant risk created by the
design approach to satisfy requirements; or the user
requirement for early initial capability (utilization of
software). [Ref. 38:p. 15]
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Although the evolutionary development process can be
applied to any development effort, it is best applied to very
large software development projects or when intermediate
software products are necessary or required. The evolutionary
model reduces large programming efforts into manageable size,
then breaks the system requirements into phases and applies
the waterfall life cycle to each phase. This method allows
the positive demonstration of evidence that the final product
will work effectively.
The prototyping approach is designed to bypass the
normal software documentation in favor of speed of develop-
ment. Instead, a prototype program is developed to
demonstrate proof of concept. Once the concept is
demonstrated, the prototype program is discarded and the
standard waterfall development process, including the
production of documentation, is followed to produce the final
software product. Because the prototype software program has
no documentation, it is virtually unmaintainable, and
therefore of little use except to prove the required concept.
The development process, as detailed above, is ideally
suited to implement software reuse at the program or project
level. The actual reuse implementation process is much like
the software life cycle maintenance process. However, this is
not to imply that the reuse process can be integrated into the
process just anywhere.
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Recalling that the definition of reuse includes any
new application of existing components (i.e., requirements,
designs, specifications, source code, and test plans,
procedures, results and documentation) the opportunity for
utilization software reuse methods is quite obvious.
C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR REUSE
The first step in applying reuse to any new system is to
examine the operational domain of the system under scrutiny.
In essence, if the system to be upgraded or developed is a
missile, then other missile systems should be considered as
candidates for potential reuse contributions. Other areas
which should be targeted for review for reuse application
should be systems which incorporate a particular character-
istic or functional capability identified as being
conceptually necessary or required in the concept exploration
phase of program development.
During the System Definition phase, a close examination
should be made of existing architectures in similar systems.
Reuse requires that these architectures be examined for
advantages and opportunities to incorporate both hardware and
software technology into the new system. Although fielded
systems generally contain less than state-of-the-art or
leading-edge technologies, reuse of existing architectural
concepts preclude large expenditures on concept exploration —
essentially eliminating the re-invention of the wheel. Even
something as seemingly minor as the approach used to develop
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the architecture in an existing system can be utilized to save
time and money in system development. Any reuse of archi-
tecture will necessitate further investigation of the existing
system for reuse of other components.
Reuse of existing systems specifications and associated
documentation can provide baseline requirements for new
systems as-well-as systems undergoing upgrade. If nothing
else, a comprehensive review of requirements for currently
fielded similar systems should highlight shortcomings in
requirements identification and definition. Test procedures,
standards, and results of similar systems should be examined,
again with the idea of baselining. As mentioned earlier,
testing is critical and can lead to devastating results in the
end product when incremental testing shows the system
development to be on target, but the final product falls short
of overall performance specifications. Only after a project
is complete and undergoing operational testing does it become
apparent that the system is inadequate, usually requiring more
time and money to fix the problems, if they can be fixed at
all. Reuse can potentially save considerable time and money
if applied at this stage of the software development process.
Even if actual requirements and specifications from other
systems are not reused, the contribution of examination and
comparison will pay valuable dividends even if only
demonstrating what not to do in software development.
45
The next step in the software development process,
preliminary design, is the first phase in which actual coded
modules can be examined for potential reuse. Applying reuse
at this phase requires examination of those systems identified
in the previous phases as having similar requirements,
specifications, and performance characteristics. Careful
scrutiny of selected target systems while simultaneously
establishing the preliminary design should provide opportunity
for the developer to compare and contrast actual modular
breakdown with proposed modules. Because reuse in this phase
entails identification and comparison of functions or
hierarchical modules which can contain hundreds of lines of
code, it is possible that actual code as-well-as module
concepts or functions could be utilized in the developing
system.
Reusing actual code will substantially reduce time spent
on detailed design. It may be possible to incorporate
directly (or after slight modification) , any reusable modules
identified during the last step. Direct injection of reusable
modules will eliminate time spent on detailed design and
during the coding phase. Additionally, this will also have
positive impact on related testing, providing early informa-
tion which could potentially impact other modules and
associated testing.
If direct reuse of modules or hierarchical functions
proves impractical, reuse can still be helpful in the
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decomposition of the proposed system. Although not absolutely
certain, the probability is high that new systems, unless
incorporating radically new technology, will have some
commonality of function or design with existing fielded
systems, thus offering potential for reuse of decomposed
forms.
During the coding and testing phase, the traditional
concept of software reuse is applicable. That is, the
traditional concept of line-by-line review of coded software,
classified by standard domain analysis. This approach would
be used for those modules which have not been the recipients
of imported reusable modules identified in previous phases.
Although it may sounder easier to commit these detailed
modules to standard encoding procedures, the developer still
runes the risk of generating errors in the code. And, as
mentioned earlier, testing must be considered, developed, and
tested. Testing of the new code can be time consuming. And
while a line by line search (by domain) can be time consuming,
it may still be quicker and cheaper than developing the
individual coded lines. Reuse at this point also offers the
potential of utilizing previously debugged and tested code,
thus saving time. As sufficient code becomes catalogued, it
may someday be possible to draw nearly 75 percent of new
programs from reuse libraries, either as functional modules or
as individual lines of code, with the remaining 25 percent
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consisting of the requisite software bindings and new code to
utilize technological advancements.
Although integration and system testing cannot directly
benefit from reuse, the two areas will benefit indirectly.
Because reuse can significantly reduce design and development
times and thus the time spent on the associated testing and
debugging cycle, the program should have more time in the
overall schedule for integration and system testing.
Additionally, the use of previously developed, and
successfully tested and deployed software systems components
can substantially reduce the integration debugging process
time.
The maintenance phase of reuse candidate software programs
should be referred to throughout the development process of
new programs. Each step of the candidate programs for reuse
should be analyzed for potential inclusion in the developing
software program and then cross referenced with the
maintenance documentation to determine faults or problems in
the original programming. Any anomalies and errors detected
and corrected in the original software and its test plan can
then be applied or implemented into the new development. If
correctly documented, the maintenance phase of programs
targeted for reuse provides corrective guidance useful in
cutting error detection time found in the original
programming, and prevents repetition of errors found in reused
software components.
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Clearly, software reuse is applicable throughout the
development process. It can be both cost and time effective,
but there are limitations that should be readily apparent.
Only successful, well-documented programs should be candidates
for reuse. Programs which suffered from habitual teething
problems during development should not be used, even if the
program has been fielded. While a fielded program can be
judged to be at least marginally successful, software which
suffered through slow and error prone development generally
suffers from poor planning, design, and execution, thus
providing a poor model for new program development. As with
any program development, a critical analysis should be
performed of the risk involved with reuse candidate programs.
Obviously, high risk programs based on dubious software
programs should only be referred to for the lessons they can
provide in error analysis and detection.
D. REUSE INHIBITORS
Although the software reuse procedure for new program
development is fairly straight forward, there are a number of
factors which have so far prevented employment of reuse on a
widespread basis. These inhibitors cover a wide range of
areas, but can be condensed into several primary categories.
These categories cover 1) standards, 2) training and
education, 3) management, 4) lack of centralized and cataloged
assets, and 5) legal and contractual issues [Ref. 39:pp. 1-8].
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While the management category would seem to encompass the
reuse inhibitors from the program manager's perspective, in
actuality, all of the categories bear some impact on reuse
implementation. Each category contains inhibitors which
actually affect areas outside what could be considered the
bounds of that particular category. And, within each
category, the separate inhibitors also carry overlapping
influence.
The following is an analysis of the five primary
categories of software reuse inhibitors. It will focus on the
individual factors within each category and their impact on
specific areas, applications, or implementation procedures and
techniques of software reuse.
1. Standards
a. Lack of Standards
The lack of standards in such areas as hardware
and software architectures, and commonly utilized software
languages, perpetuated by what the DoD requests and requires
and by what the industry and contractors provide, contributes
greatly to the difficulty of attempting to implement software
reuse. This is especially true of the military attempts at
software reuse. Because the military uses civilian
contractors to develop most software, the each contractor
generally has commercial interests which produce software in
a preferred commercially marketable language, there is a
tendency by the contractors to develop DoD programs in the
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same language of choice. Once the program is developed, it is
then usually translated into the DoD preferred Ada computer
language. (The term "usually translated" is used because the
requirement for DoD to use Ada is fairly recent. A large
amount of equipment utilizing a variety of software languages
has been fielded prior to the implementation of this
requirement, therefore it is impractical to expect this code
to ever be compiled into Ada. A factor impacting the
compilation of Ada in programs currently under development is
the loose enforcement of the regulation. For any number of
reasons, the software development contractor may be exempted
from delivering a final software product in Ada.) However,
because this is a higher order language, each line of which
may be the transposition of several separate lines of another
code which in turn can be composed of several levels of
subcommands and routines, it does not decompose easily or
simply when attempting to examine the code for potential
reuse.
From the hardware perspective, the problem seems
somewhat simpler to understand. Although two different
programs may be written in the same language and may even have
very similar applications or domains, they may be designed to
operate in very different hardware architectures. The
different hardware systems and their basic approach to program
execution may effectively prohibit porting or reuse of other
program segments onto targeted hardware. Whereas some
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architectures rely on hardware solutions to specific problems,
others rely on software solutions to address those same
problems, consequently, the hardware design will dictate the
software developer's approach to the program development.
b. Lack of standard or common development
methodologies
Although the DoD is governed by a host of regula-
tions designed to provide control and structure to the
development process, civilian software developers are under no
such regulation. Each software development company has its
own internal program and guidelines. Consequently, the
development process described earlier, which so readily lends
itself to a structured building block approach and provides
significant documentation so easily adaptable to reuse
analysis, is not followed by those outside the DoD. As a
result, adequate documentation for potential reuse may no be
available. The usual drivers of poor or insufficient
documentation is shoddy program design and incoherent
structuring of modules, both of which dissuade reuse
implementation. These programs often suffer a painful
development process and are generally plagued with problems
throughout their life cycle, making them unlikely candidates
for reuse.
c. Lack of Common Notation for Describing Designs
and Requirements
Although seemingly minor, this inhibitor to
software reuse complements both the Lack of Standards and the
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Lack of Standard or Common Software Development Methodologies.
Just like spoken languages with their own unique alphabets,
software languages have their own specific and distinct
symbology and notation. A programmer experienced in one
language may have only a vague understanding of another,
rendering any attempt by the programmer to analyze a program
targeted for reuse an exercise in futility. Although most
symbology and notation has comparable representation in every
language, the cost of translation and transposition can be
prohibitively expensive for a project with such a dubious
potential payoff.
Another problem occurs when attempting to measure
the performance of programs against an accepted standard. The
lack of commonly accepted hardware performance standards and
software metrics prohibits the developer from effectively
comparing the performance of one program or program segment
against another. This is a very complex concept, as measuring
performance is more than just operating against the clock,
the measure of software performance must include allowances
for hardware induced performance, as-well-as broad parameters
which define singular computations and program executions,
the measure of hardware performance on the other hand must
take into account how each specific piece of software goes
about the execution of its tasks, and negate those effects to
accurately measure performance. The lack of standardized
metrics or a defined process to test either hardware or
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software components prevents any real attempt at even
examining the broad base of existing software for potential
candidate reuse programs.
d. Lack of Methodology for Extending Standards
There are literally hundreds of software
development and consulting firms in operation in the U.S.
today. Many of these firms are currently engaged in develop-
ment or consulting efforts with the DoD, and are often in
direct competition with each other. Consequently, there is
seldom a free exchange of information between firms on
progress in either software or hardware development.
Additionally, each of these firms measures its progress
against its own internally accepted standards, and while some
of these standards may be shared or subscribed to by many
firms, not all firms agree on all standards, nor are they
necessarily the latest standards. Precisely because most of
these firms are competitors, any advances in metrics, design,
hardware, or development processes, are often kept secret by
the developers t gain the most rom the advancement, either in
monetary or technological terms. It is seldom in the firm's
best interest to advance the general knowledge of its
competitors. Current efforts by the industry to track
progress and standards of performance consist of deriving
information from trade publications, advertising copy, and
reverse engineering efforts. consequently, there exists
within the industry no mechanism or body of regulators (other
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than the DoD) to decide what are the appropriate standards for
the industry, how to ensure compliance with these standards,
how and when to upgrade these standards, and finally, how to
disseminate this information throughout the industry. As with
the lack of standards, the lack of a mechanism to promote and
disseminate those standards inhibits reuse by acting as a
force multiplier for an already crippled industry.
e. Lack of Standardised Definitions of Reused,
Common, Shared Software
In an industry bereft of standards, it is not
surprising that a common definition for reused or shared
software cannot be agreed upon. This is a simple situation of
putting the cart before the horse. It would be impractical if
not impossible to define such things as reused, common, or
shared software without first addressing the industry wide
problem of general software standards. Obviously, software
reuse is inhibited by the lack of a standardized definition of
what constitutes reuse. (If you can't describe it, you can't
define it, and if you can't define it, you can't find it, and
finally, if you can't find it, you can't use it!)
Additionally, the lack of a regulatory body or dissemination
mechanism adds to the inherent reuse inhibitions.
f . Lack of Weil-Defined Reuse Methodologies
The compliment to the lack of adequate and
standardized definitions for reuse or shared software is the
lack of any well-defined or standardized reuse methodologies.
While the industry cannot settle on standard software
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development models, it would be totally unrealistic to believe
the industry can settle on any standardized models for reuse
implementation. Again, any attempt to implement an undefined
concept across an entire industry can only meet with failure.
2. Training and Education
a. Reuse Inhibits Innovation and Reduces Competitive
Advantage
Within the industry, software reuse is viewed as
a rehashing of old ideas and technology. In an industry where
there are literally scores of software producers, innovation
is a market discriminator. A key strategy in marketing a
software product is to differentiate the program from its
competitors. This is usually done by focusing on some new and
innovative feature or gimmick. Consequently, reusing
previously released software eliminates this potential
marketing approach. An additional factor that the software
firm must consider is the actual software engineering
workforce. If the aforementioned workforce views software
reuse as a restraint on creativity or a hindrance to
innovation, the company may be hard pressed to maintain
experienced and talented software engineers. The perception
that a firm cannot engage in software reuse while keeping
talented, creative people on the payroll, and thus no produce
innovative, cutting-edge competitive software products is a
tremendous inhibitor to actual reuse application. This is
true of the software firm, whether operating in the commercial
market or the DoD contractor arena.
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b. Lack of Readily Accessible Information on Reuse
Although the concept of software reuse has been
around for years, there is a dearth of information readily
available on the subject. General industry attitude combined
with the lack of standards and methodology has left software
reuse in its infancy while the primary focus of the industry
promoted evolution of program engineering.
Software reuse information is skewed by rumors and
falsehoods about the subject. This is the result of the ill
informed or misinformed generally interjecting their bias into
the available information. It is important to remember that
programmers are often paid by the number of lines of code they
generate, and consequently find it in their best interest to
inhibit something like reuse which they might perceive as a
threat to their livelihood.
This overall lack of quality information on reuse
has stunted interest in the subject and the proliferation of
usable information. The same programmers who may see reuse as
a potential financial impingement are also the same
programmers that write industry magazines. It is entirely
possible that information about reuse could be stifled for
reasons of self interest. Without accurate and adequate
information or any mechanism to spread that information, it is
doubtful that reuse will ever be implemented on a wide spread
basis.
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c. Limited Training for Reuse
For those interested in reuse, whether they are
managers or engineers, contractors or the Government, there is
little or no training available. As mentioned earlier, there
is a dearth of standards within the industry. Conseguently,
very few companies or organizations are inclined to invest
money, time, and resources into training personnel to engage
in or manage reuse of software components. The lack of
training also impacts the amount of information available on
reuse. There is a dependency cycle in which information is
needed to inaugurate training, but training is needed to
develop information. Once the cycle begins, it will be self-
sustaining. However, getting the cycle started may be a
monumental task.
d. Lack of Knowledge and Training of Data Rights and
Licensing Procedures
Although this might be considered as a topic under
the Lack of Available Reuse Information category, it is really
more of a legal problem than an information problem. Proprie-
tary rights and data rights of published or contracted
software are by law the property of the developer (except
where contracted developers give up those rights as part of
the development project) and can be used only under license
rom that development firm. For any potential reuser, there
must be a license agreement, not just to use the software, but
possibly to decompose it, alter it, and finally combine it
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with other code from similar sources. There are a number of
problems with this concept.
First, to submit a program or programs to reuse
will require substantial documentation of the software and
testing. The producer, in order to protect his interests in
this process will need to engage in management of the software
which, for an independent producer especially, can take
considerable time. Either the producer manages the program
himself or the firm establishes an internal mechanism to
manage this process. This would require manpower, facilities,
equipment, and cash. Obviously, this investment must be
weighed against the potential profit to be made through
licensing reusable software. An additional problem is
potential liability for software problems which may come from
a firm's reused software. In an era of intense litigation
over producer liability it could be catastrophic for the
developer if his software caused a major software crash for
another developer.
For the potential reuser, the problems are even
more complex. The potential reuser must either be ready to
spend great amounts of time and money to analyze potential
reuse candidates, or he must develop a mechanism to conduct
reuse business. Although this sounds relatively simple, the
establishment of a reuse management mechanism for the
potential reuser would be costly and have a tendency to grow.
The essential structure would need to include a manager
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steeped in software engineering as-well-as contracting. A
bevy of software engineers familiar with internal projects
requiring reusable components would be required to research
and analyze each and every potential reuse candidate program.
The section would require both lawyers and contracting
personnel to work out the details of agreements which would
allow the software engineers to examine other programs as-
well-as use favorable components. And finally, any effort of
this type will require a multitude of administrative people to
manage the records and documentation.
A final problem which may plague the potential
reuser is the fact that many software forms are here today and
gone tomorrow. Although the programs are copyrighted, the
company may no longer be in business. Any reuser is still
bound by law to license the software for reuse. This means
that the reuser must find an organization or person with
proprietary rights over the software. This can be a long and
tedious process and may not be worth the time and effort to
conduct a search versus just developing the software from
scratch.
Until the legal fundamentals are worked out and
guidelines established and firms are ready to make a concerted
effort to implement software reuse, this area will continue to
be a problem and will definitely impact reuse implementation.
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•. Software Common Practice of Redesign/Redevelop
Versus Hardware Incremental Development Practice
Within the automation industry, there are two
distinct practices with respect to hardware and software
development and improvement. Firms generally approach
hardware upgrades or revisions using the incremental
improvement technique. Their approach to software on the
other hand, is one of new program development instead of
measured improvement.
Essentially, firms utilize existing hardware
platforms and apply focused technological improvements to
specific areas of the platform, incrementally improving
performance. There are several reasons for this hardware
improvement approach. First, the pace of hardware improvement
moves only as fast as technological advancement. Although
revolutionary improvements do happen within the industry, most
of the effort is focused on improving existing technology.
Consequently, great technological strides or revolutionary
improvements are few and far between. Second, is the matter
of economics. All of the firms in the industry are in
business to make a profit, and each firm does this in a
variety of different ways. Firms make money on providing
upgrade components to existing equipment — again, an effort
to capitalize on technological advancement. Another method
for gleaning a profit commonly utilized by the industry is to
offer a wide variety of models utilizing common components or
technology similar to practices found in the automobile
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industry. Finally, and most controversial, is the practice of
utilizing planned technological obsolescence and controlled
technological insertion. This method calls for utilizing
combinations of components which have a limited or planned
life-span with respect to leading-edge technology. This
planned obsolescence is coupled with carefully calculated
technological insertion. Essentially, a firm will time the
release of technological improvements as a marketing tool to
boost sales where current machines offered for sale have lost
their technological edge to the competition. This idea ties
in to the concept of maintaining a desired level of market
share. If a firm wished to maintain its current level of
market share, the firm may hold some improvements in reserve
to counter competitive efforts by the competition to increase
market share. And finally, incremental improvements are the
backbone of the lucrative upgrade market mentioned earlier.
Software development on the other hand is viewed
as a cottage industry within the automation field. Because
software development is generally less equipment and personnel
intensive, it is viewed as being easier than hardware develop-
ment. This view is predicated on the industry's lack of
standardization with respect to almost every area of software
development. Instead of teams of engineers working together
to develop improved hardware, the software environment is
populated by individuals, meticulously and painstakingly
developing and testing a program on the targeted machine. The
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industry views software development more as an art form than
a science. Consequently, software developers are generally
subject to less management and control than hardware
developers. This lack of tight control eliminates any
incentive within the firm to utilize software reuse. After
all, creativity is viewed as an asset in the software field
and reuse is held to be in direct contradiction to that idea.
And much like artists, software developers reflect these
values and beliefs, consequently, left to their own devices,
few opt to review old programs for usable parts or pieces.
Finally, because there are considerably fewer resources
required or utilized in software development than hardware
development, it is viewed as being considerably easier than
hardware development.
It is necessary to make a clarification at this
point. Software is commonly released in versions, with each
version representing an improvement over previous versions.
These improvements are usually nothing more than refined or
debugged previous editions of current software. Therefore,
these new versions of the software are essentially not true
revisions or design changes of the programming. Eliminating
version revisions as true improvements, actual software
improvement comes in the form of new programs, offering new
capabilities, tools, and quicker program execution.
The two different approaches stem from the manner
of development for each of these areas. Hardware development
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is expensive due to its nature. Development or improvement of
hardware products requires expensive laboratories, equipped
with state-of-the-art test, diagnostic, and measurement
equipment, capital intensive production facilities, expensive
distribution networks, and extensive training for maintenance
personnel. Hardware is the product of teams of tightly
managed engineers operating in a structured environment.
Improvements in hardware are incremental or marginally
evolutionary versus revolutionary. Firms have found it in
their best interest to tightly manage these assets to
appreciate the highest possible return on the dollar. Whereas
software improvements seem to reflect flashes of individual
brilliance, unencumbered by management or large quantities of
equipment. Management is less apt to indulge itself in an
area that defies standard organizational structure, management
techniques, and time lines. Until the industry institutes
software standards, individualism at the expense of reuse will
remain the norm.
3 • Management
a. Lack of Program Office Incentive to Initiate Reuse
Without exception, software development within the
DoD has been focused at the individual program level as
opposed to a broad-based focus aimed at multiple reusable
applications. Because each Program Manager is tasked with the
development of his particular program and will be judged
accordingly, there is little interest on the part of the PM to
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go beyond the program mandate. Even with programs that must
be tied together, such as the Army Tactical Command and
Control System (ATCCS) , which requires the interface of the
separate software development programs of the five BFAs, there
has been no effort to exploit software reuse, structure
standardization, or interface bindings.
The PM's area of responsibility, which can include
both hardware and software development, really only
encompasses a small domain with respect to either of these
areas. Consequently, the PM has only a limited ability to
influence anything outside of his mandated area of responsi-
bility. Coupled with this limited ability to influence
outside areas, is the political danger to the PM of expanding
his control or influence into another PM's domain or program.
Although the Army presents itself as an apolitical
organization, which is true of the tactical and operational
portions of the force, it is not necessarily representative of
the acquisition and procurement areas. These areas are
structured along the lines of civilian organizations and are
involved in similar pursuits. The program development and
acquisition field is mostly the domain o the Army's civilian
workforce, and very much emulates the politics the civilian
industry it mirrors. Domains of influence and spans of
managerial control within the Acquisition Corps are often
jealously guarded, with interlopers being shunted, ostracized,
or victims of political paternalism.
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b. Lack of Personal Recognition or Economic
Incentive for Developer of Reused Components
Putting all the factors together, it is obvious
that there is no incentive for the individual developer to
either develop or utilize reusable software. The developer is
generally paid on a by-line production basis, consequently, to
produce reusable code or implement such code would be
tantamount to reducing or eliminating one's livelihood.
Additionally, software development management is
generally pulled "from the ranks," perpetuating the relaxed,
almost loose management atmosphere prevalent in most develop-
ment companies. Because of the relatively unregulated
development atmosphere, there is little guidance or direction
aimed at reuse employment or development.
As mentioned earlier, the lack of industry
standards and formal mechanisms to either disseminate
information or govern rights of reusable software serves again
to inhibit the individual software developer from either
utilizing or developing reusable code. Because code and
documentation are not readily available without extensive
legal negotiations and because there is no royalty mechanism
in place to reward the developer for his efforts, there is no
incentive to move in this direction, especially for the
individual.
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c. Lack of Trade-Off Mechanism Between Requirements
and Reuse
A requirement is by definition, a need. Software
is written to satisfy the need. Any differentiation between
the requirement and the performance of the software does not
qualify as meeting the need. In order to implement reusable
software, the requirements must be reasonably flexible or
generic in nature. Unfortunately, however, software require-
ments are not usually flexible or generic. Consequently, it
is difficult to find the necessary middle ground to satisfy
the demands of both.
The problem stems from the development process.
The requirements for any project are drawn up early on and are
the result of mission need statements generated from the user
community. Because these needs are drawn up without regard to
software development or software reuse, no compromises or
trade-offs are established. Consequently, there is little
room for software reuse if the requirements are to be effec-
tively satisfied.
d. Lack of Reuse Cost Models or Metrics
As stated earlier, an industry wide lack of
standards in software development, architectures, and metrics
has effectively deterred the development of any reasonably
reliable cost models for software reuse. This is almost the
proverbial chicken and egg situation. In order to determine
the cost effectiveness of implementing software reuse, it is
necessary to evaluate existing software reuse cost models.
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However, without effective and widespread utilization of
reuse, valid cost models cannot be developed. As with any new
technology, it often requires investment of a great deal of
time, money, and resources to begin the initial venture. Only
after relatively large and risky expenditures of capital does
a company normally begin to see positive returns on invest-
ment. The current state of the software reuse industry is
much the same way. The current measure of risk has so far
inhibited reuse and the associated models which could someday
prove its profitability.
e. Limited Vision or Leadership for Reuse
As stated earlier, management of software
development is very much an inside job, consequently, those
boosted to leadership or management positions are often
interested in maintaining the status quo versus implementation
of new cutting edge ideas. This is not necessarily because
those elevated to management are against new ideas, but more
because of the reputation established by the company before
the new leadership took over. Essentially, some companies are
known for certain software traits, designs, or architectures
which are accepted and expected within the industry. To break
with this established convention can be costly in terms of
lost customers.
However, the greatest inhibition comes from a
general lack of knowledge about reuse in general. For the
manager, the requisite questions of how to classify software,
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where to find the necessary reusable software candidates, how
to navigate the legal obstacles to reuse, and how to motivate
the actual developers to implement reuse are insurmountable
simply because of the relative infancy of the field and the
lack of managerial experience or established guidelines in
this area. There is one other simple, yet looming reason for
the lack of reuse implementation by management. A great
number of those rising to managerial positions in the software
development field do so by default. Most lack the drive and
aspirations found with managers in other areas of business.
Consequently, there is a marked reluctance to aggressively
pursue such controversial and dubious endeavors as software
reuse
.
f . Lack of Knowledge and Training on Data Rights and
Licensing Procedures
Software, like nearly every other product on the
commercial market is surrounded and supported by a host of
laws designed to protect the producer's product, his ideas, or
development process from being copied without permission or
monetary compensation. Copyright laws similar to those
covering audio and video tapes and discs govern the software
industry. However, unlike audio and video tapes, software,
although relatively easy to copy or pirate, is of little use
without documentation, and of no use unless it can be
decomposed. Therefore the problem here is not piracy, but
licensing — the authorized use of all or a portion of a piece
of software (to include documentation) by another company in
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exchange for monetary compensation. This is a relatively new
field with respect to software, and lacks precedents for
establishment of guidelines or rules.
Because of the vagaries of software development
and business, questions and concerns addressing the potential
profitability of a program which contains reused software,
potential liability of the owner of reused code, and potential
licensing of software components which are composed of new
code as well as reused code pose special problems for software
development companies. Although many companies are faced with
similar problems which impact the decision making process,
very few face the situation wherein their product can have an
indeterminate effect when imported into another program. The
potential outcome of such a situation could be devastating if
for some reason the reuse software creates problems or systems
failure. The issue of who is responsible, the importer or the
original developer, is very much in question in such cases and
has yet to be determined in potential licensing agreements.
The issue of product liability in cases of
software failure is only one problem however. Just as
important, at least to those individuals who develop software
is the issue of by-line payments. Should the individual
developer be paid for the reuse of his product, and if so, how
much, and how should this issue be approached for a software
program which contains reused software and is itself a
candidate for software reuse?
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This may be moot if the target software is altered
to facilitate reuse. It does however, raise another issue —
that of technical propriety. If a piece of reuse software is
altered to facilitate reuse, does the original developer
remain liable for problems? Who controls licensing of altered
reusable code?
Finally, when the Government engages a contractor
in software development, the Government generally requires the
proprietary rights with the software. This presents problems
when the software contains reused code. What are the legal
rights and obligations of the original developer of the code,
and what are the rights and obligations of the second
developer or reuser with respect to the different parts of the
code? Who is responsible for the performance of the code, and
who takes responsibility for failure?
These and other issues have yet to be addressed by
either the Government or the software industry. Until these
questions are answered however, potential legal obstacles will
continue to be major obstacles in implementing software reuse.
g. Contractors Not Paid for Productivity
It should be clear by now that the bulk of
inhibitors work in concert to prevent the widespread implemen-
tation of software reuse. But regardless of the wide range of
reasons for lack of implementation, the bottom line in most
cases is money. Today, contractors are not required by the
Government to utilize reuse. And because of all the reasons
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stated above as-well-as the implications for the industry —
widespread implementation of reuse would substantially reduce
the number of competitors in the business — there has not
been a rush to reusable software. Further, it would be
ludicrous to assume that any developer would either design a
program to be reusable or utilize reusable code without some
sort of incentive, either in terms of more follow-up contracts
or direct monetary compensation, while at the same time facing
possible elimination from the industry by the very thing under
development. An developer interested in perpetuating his
business realizes that reuse could be a serious threat to
continued operation. As pointed out earlier, software
developers view reuse with some skepticism, realizing that
widespread implementation could change the face of the
industry, eliminating some of the players and the way business
is done. For any concept with such a potentially catastrophic
impact, both the short and long term monetary rewards must be
enormous. The current system falls far short of offering this
type of reward.
h. Other Potential Reasons
Finally, there are a number of obvious inhibitors
that should be mentioned. These inhibitors need little or no
explanation, and are listed as follows:
(1) Budget and schedule pressure.
(2) Increased organizational interdependence due to reuse.
(3) Redesign versus redevelop mentality of program offices.
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(4) Profit and greed on the part of the developer.
(5) Software is not viewed as an asset in program
development.
4. Lack of Centralized Catalog of Assets
a. Too Few Libraries
The current approach to utilizing software reuse
is to catalog lines of code and provide access to that code
through a system of libraries. These libraries would
categorize code by a multitude of characteristics and provide
the code and its relevant documentation through an automated
search and retrieval system. Currently however, there are
only a few woefully small libraries currently in existence.
Although the library concept is the most reason-
able approach to real world implementation of software reuse,
it also presents a number of unique problems. First, who is
the proprietor of the library system — the Government,
commercial business concerns, or some non-profit organization?
Second, what categories are logical and reasonable for the
classification of the very broad spectrum of software? Next,
with such a prolific amount of software already in existence
and more being produced every day, how many of these facil-
ities will be enough to meet requirements? And finally, who
should pay for the initial capital investment necessary to
establish a series of libraries and their requisite automation
links? These issues will be some of the first and most
important to be addressed once the Government and industry
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begin to accept and develop software reuse on an wide spread
basis.
b. No Easy Way to Search For or Retrieve Components
Touched on earlier, reusable code will most likely
be made accessible through a series of libraries. Although
this should make the job of locating large quantities of
reusable software components easier, the task of finding the
right components within this large reservoir of software can
be monumental. A major inhibition to reuse is the time
required to locate potentially reusable software that conforms
to the needed template. Even with automated libraries, the
shear volume of potentially reusable code could literally take
weeks or months to comb. It can take twice that much time to
test.
Another problem is how to search for the necessary
code. There are millions of potential categories or software
classification, ranging from overall program classification to
subroutine and individual code segment classification. Most
of these components fall within the domain of several of these
potential categories, making the task of assigning code to a
specific category even more difficult. Any programmer seeking
to utilize reusable code will need to have a detailed descrip-
tion of the type of code required. the process could be
equated to trying to find one specific piece of an unassembled
jigsaw puzzle. Until a coherent and easily utilized search
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and retrieval system can be established and implemented,
software reuse cannot be a viable development tool.
c. No Defined Way to Test or Accept Components
Having examined the classification and storage
problems as-well-as the search and retrieval problems, the
next logical step is to examine testing and acceptance
criteria. Once a developer has waded through the system to
locate reuse candidate software, it must be tested to ensure
the code fits the need or requirement. Currently however, the
only test available is to actually integrate the reusable code
into the program and test for functionality. The testing
process can be expensive and time consuming. Of great concern
to any developer is the quality of potentially reusable
software. As with any endeavor, there is a right way and a
wrong way to do things. The same is true for software.
Shoddy or unproven techniques used to develop software make
for an equally shoddy or unreliable product. Poor quality
software can make integration difficult or impossible. It can
also lead to difficulties when trying to layer or host
application software on top of an operating system utilizing
reused software, or vice-versa.
But of even greater concern are the proprietary
rights issues described earlier. Should the software prove
unusable, is the developer still obligated to pay user and
licensing fees? Further, does the library serve as the
licensing agent or should each interested party engage in
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negotiation to arrive at some mutually agreeable arrangement?
And in reference to the quality issue, what is the developer's
recourse after discovering he has inadvertently reused a poor
quality piece of software? These and other questions must be
answered through the legal system, library system, and
evolving efforts to standardize the industry before they can
stifle software reuse in its infancy.
d. Configuration Management Across the Library
Network
Software products generally go through an upgrade/
update process that works to create newer and more refined
versions of a particular program. Often these changes or
upgrades are so prolific and frequent that five or more
versions of the software can be in use simultaneously. The
latest version is usually the most refined and error free of
all the configurations available. Keeping up with these
changes and associated documentation means replacing current
versions contained in the libraries with the updated versions.
This can be a costly and time consuming process, and leads to
more questions. Specifically, should upgraded versions of
software be provided to developers currently using earlier
versions of the software? Are amended licensing agreements
necessary? Clearly, as with the other categories of
inhibitors, a great deal of work will be necessary to overcome
both the obvious and subtle problems in instituting reuse on
an industry wide basis.
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5. Legal and Contractual Issues
Most of the major legal and contractual issues
concerning the implementation of software reuse have been
mentioned above. They are complex issues with far ranging
implication. Addressing these problems through the legal
system will take years, and in some cases will result in
dubious outcomes. The complexity, cost, and extent of these
issues, possibly more than any others, will prevent the
software industry from accepting and adopting reuse. Few
companies today can stand the withering legal assault that
marks a product liability suit, nor can most companies accept
the staggering fines imposed for copyright infringement or
piracy of proprietary data. Neither do most companies believe
it is in their best interest (profitable) to be obligated to
maintain possibly legally mandated technological upgrades of
software in libraries, insure reusers receive updated or
upgraded software and appropriate documentation, or maintain
large staffs of legal personnel to look after the company's
best interest with respect to reuse. Therefore, most
companies have so far given reuse a wide berth. And, because
of the drawn out legal process and exorbitant expense of
retaining the requisite legal expertise to address these





Obviously, the software development cycle is a complex
process, involving risk, time, money, equipment and personnel.
Yet even more complex is the reuse equation of software
development. The PM can have either a positive or negative
effect on software development, even given a lock-step
software development process. As nearly every step, the PM or
those working for him have the ability to develop code and
implement measures to aid or retard the ability of the
software to be reused.
For every advantage demonstrated by the implementation of
software reuse, there seems to be a myriad of reuse
inhibitors. These inhibitors all fall into five specific
categories — Standards, Training and Education, Management,
Lack of a Centralized Asset Catalog, and Legal and Contractual
Issues. And while individually most of these obstacles,
whatever the category, are small, taken as a group they are
most daunting. Unfortunately, there is no way to separate
most of these inhibitors from each other. Most are directly
related to others, both within and across categories, often
instilling a sense of dread and hopelessness on would-be
reusers
.
While this chapter has focused on the development process
and the associated roadblocks to implementing software reuse,
the primary driver or force involved in the development
process for the Government is the Program Manager. The human
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factor can be the greatest asset in implementing reuse, or it
can be the greatest adversary against implementing reuse.
This is the built-in bias of every software development
program. It is that portion of the program that can be both
the easiest and the hardest to change.
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IV. THE VIEW FROM THE TOP
A. INTRODUCTION
The documented inhibitors to software reuse described in
the last chapter clearly demonstrated the propensity of
management to fail in the decision making process as opposed
to succumbing to technical shortcomings. This is simply
because most of the technical inhibitors to reuse are actual,
identifiable problems which will have real answers or
solutions. Most of these problems are being addressed and are
in the process of being resolved.
The biggest obstacle to implementation of software reuse
seems to be breaching the nearly impenetrable wall of human
nature and resistance to change. Specifically, the beliefs,
techniques, and bias produced by years of involvement in
program development stand as staunch testimony to the human
aversion to trying new things. Once someone learns what works
with respect to any given area of application, human nature
resists the urge to exchange that "proven" approach for an
unproven or untested method. By the time a person reaches the
position of program or project manager, he has accumulated
years of experience in program development. Unfortunately,
the greatest lesson learned seems to be that the penalty for
failure can be an abbreviated career. Consequently, the
potential for inclusion of a relatively unproven process such
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as software reuse into a software development project by the
PM would appear to be inversely proportional to his career
aspirations. In order to either confirm or discount this
idea, at least with respect to software reuse, numerous
interviews were conducted with program, project, and product
managers as-well-as their deputy PMs, and hardware and
software division or directorate chiefs. 8 What follows is a
discussion of the personal views of those most involved and
concerned with software development within DoD.
B. PROGRAM/PROJECT/PRODUCT MANAGER
More than any other individual, the PM has the ability to
have the greatest impact on the development of any project.
The PM is ultimately responsible for program development and
necessarily has control over the assets within his organiza-
tion which have direct influence on the final product. The
PMs interviewed were involved in the development of either
systems utilizing embedded software or separate software
systems. Most, but not all, were engineers, with electrical
engineering being by far the most predominate discipline. Two
of three PMs were senior U.S. Army field grade officers, with
the other third being senior civilian Government employees.
All were at least conversant in both hardware and software
systems technology. However, as might be expected, PMs
8Interviewees were afforded anonymity, hence no names,
ranks, or program/project/product titles are given. The data
presented here are by necessity a composite picture of the
results of over thirty interviews.
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responsible for embedded systems were generally more
knowledgeable about hardware than software. The PMs with non-
technical backgrounds were less focused on the specifics of
either hardware or software development and were much more
concerned with budget and schedule problems. All of the PMs
interviewed took control of a program already in progress.
Finally, all of the programs examined had both schedule and
budget deviations from the program baselines.
Regardless of the type of software system being developed
— embedded, operating, or applications — there are some
common factors with respect to software that apply to both
types of programs and affect all PMs. Although all PMs
interviewed were aware of the concept of software reuse, most
had little in-depth knowledge of particulars of the subject.
Few could either define reuse as envisioned by DoD, or
describe the necessary application environment. Fewer still
believed that their particular program could benefit from
reuse. Most of the PMs were skeptical over the viability of
their program to even be considered for reuse, either as a
recipient of reused code or as a potential candidate for
reuse in other programs. All of the PMs cited some distrust
of other PMs' software programs with respect to application
within their own domain. (It is interesting to note that
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while being members of the Council of Colonels9
, many of those
interviewed had only cursory knowledge of the other programs'
particulars.) 10 Additionally, most voiced concerns about
responsibility for system failure when importing or exporting
code. No PM was willing to risk further complicating his
program with software reuse, citing potential problems such as
the time, money, and resources necessary to search for a
candidate code. Nearly all expressed concerns about time
necessary to integrate reusable code into the developing
program, and the potential for schedule slippage if the
testing demonstrated problems with the imported code.
All the PMs agreed that there were significant differences
between programs employing embedded systems software and those
utilizing operating and applications software programs. All
agreed that embedded systems were by far easier to control in
terms of software development, with most conceding that
control over hardware development augmented software
development. The PMs responsible for embedded systems were
able to control both hardware and software development to be
9The Council of Colonels is an advisory and steering
committee made up of military 06 (or civilian equivalent) PMs
within a PEO. They deconflict and coordinate potential high-
level problems between related programs within a PEO which
cannot be settled without an executive decision.
10Once the initial interview was conducted and a baseline
of current knowledge established, current trends and advances
in reuse as-well-as current and anticipated efforts by the DoD
were described and explained to those interviewed. Additional
questions concerning the potential impact of reuse on programs
were asked once the current reuse efforts were explained.
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mutually supportive in the development process. Those PMs
working on embedded systems also saw greater potential for
reuse in their programs once the concept was explained.
Specifically, they believed that subsequent upgrades to their
particular system could readily utilize reuse, baselining from
the original code, provided the intended upgrade was
compatible with current hardware and software architectures.
But again, all hedged when asked if they would willingly
import code from external sources into their programs. No
single PM was willing to accept the risk of utilizing reuse in
their program development, even when potential sources of
reusable code, similar domain architectures, and proven
techniques were readily available.
PMs responsible for the development of operating or
application software were even less receptive to the idea of
software reuse, at least from the importation point of view,
without question, all of the PMs in this category controlled
programs much larger and more complex than those involved in
embedded systems. Not surprisingly, the viewpoint that each
had the most difficult and complex program was prevalent among
all the PMs responsible for this type of development. All of
the PMs in this category held the attitude that if their
program did not develop the software, it could not be trusted
to meet their requirements. Additionally, few of the PMs
recognized any similarity between their programs and potential
reuse candidate programs. Although most PMs had no problem
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with exporting their software to other programs, none of the
PMs were willing to take responsibility or system failures
attributable to their exported software. All the PMs believed
the burden of responsibility for selecting proper reusable
program segments and efforts to integrate selected reusable
software components rested with the gaining program PM.
All of the queried PMs stated unequivocally that
initiating software reuse was essentially outside of the PM's
charter, and should be considered exclusively the domain of
the Program Executive Office. The consensus was nearly
unanimous that the resources did not exist at the PM level to
keep up with current trends and available reuse technology.
Additionally, the PMs pointed out that they essentially
operate in a vacuum, with only limited access to information
concerning software development in other programs. Instead,
they emphasized the PEO's responsibility for overseeing and
integrating the efforts of PMs.
C. DEPUTY PROGRAM/PROJECT/PRODUCT MANAGERS
By far the least vocal and least cooperative of those
interviewed were deputy PMs. Most, harboring further career
aspirations, were reluctant to comment one way or another on
the potential for implementation of software reuse in their
particular programs. A few however, were responsive to
questioning. All of the DPMs interviewed were Government
Civil Service employees, and possessed technical backgrounds
about evenly split between electrical engineering and
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software/hardware engineering. Of those who cooperated, most
were aware of the concept of software reuse. The DPMs were,
by far, more knowledgeable with respect to reuse than anyone
else in the program, including the PMs. In fact, those
responding to the interviews were either directly or
indirectly involved in the DoD and DA efforts to initiate
software reuse on a widespread basis. Although many of the
DPMs were more familiar with reuse than the PMs they served,
they mirrored the general attitude of the PMs with respect to
reuse implementation. Part of this can be attributed to the
politics of survival in Government service. However, part of
the responses posted by DPMs can be attributed to their
greater depth of knowledge about reuse and its potential
benefits and pitfalls.
While the PMs recognized a significant difference in
embedded versus application software systems development, the
DPMs generally discounted this perception. Nearly all the
DPMs thought that application of reuse was more a matter of
correctly defining requirements and domains than a systemic
characteristic of their particular type of program. Although
most conceded that the embedded type systems could potentially
be easier targets for applying reuse, all agreed that reuse
was equally applicable to software applications programs.
The responses of the DPMs, reflecting a substantially
different outlook on the potential of reuse, fives a clue to
the ultimate potential of software reuse. Of those DPMs
86
responding to questions, nearly all felt that practical,
simplified software reuse application would be a reality in
the near future. Most felt that reuse was in its infancy,
with incredible potential for application across almost every
future software development program in the U.S. Army. They
also agreed however, that to be effective, reuse would need to
be expanded to include development programs within each of the
other military Services and civilian agencies. This type of
response reflected a far greater understanding of the
potential for reuse than that represented by the PMs.
Although all of the DPMs expressed concerns similar to the PMs
about the resources needed to locate, integrate, and test
potential reusable code, all of the DPMs dismissed the
problems, expressing the belief that further development and
maturity of the reuse effort would eliminate these problems
over time.
Of particular interest were DPM comments about their PMs'
lack of understanding of program particulars involving aspects
of software development. Most were critical of what they
described as the PM's under control of the development
process. Specifically, a couple of DPMs believed that the PM
assumed that the software development cycle was the easy part
of the program and concentrated more on hardware development
than software development. Consequently, their programs
suffered moderate to severe teething problems with software
development costs and schedule. However, this can possibly be
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attributed to human nature and one's belief that their way is
always the better way.
As with the PMs, the DPMs believed that initiation of
software reuse was outside the domain of the PM. All felt it
was the exclusive domain of the PEO. Citing the PEO's broad
span of control and influence. Additionally, most of the DPMs
felt that the PEOs should develop and maintain the mechanism
(division or directorate) to identify potentially reusable
software components for import into programs and export out of
programs
.
D. HARDWARE/SOFTWARE DIVISION CHIEFS
Of all those interviewed, the division chiefs (DCs) were
the most vocal and passionate concerning software reuse at the
PM level. All of the division chiefs interviewed were Civil
Service employees with either electrical engineering or
software engineering backgrounds. Most had been with their
particular program since its start, and all had seen PMs come
and go. The mix of programs was about evenly split between
those developing embedded software systems, software only, and
joint hardware/software systems.
All of the DCs were familiar with the concept of software
reuse. However, only about half had a good understanding of
the mechanics of reuse or its potential. While most tried
hard to stay current in the software field (regardless of
program type) , most found that the demands of the job often
overrode these efforts. Even so, over half felt they were, by
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far, much more knowledgeable than the PM about the mechanics
of the software development process, and about software in
general. Nearly all felt the PM exercised too much control
over the everyday operations of their divisions and that the
PM's lack of first hand or current knowledge of the latest
trends in both the software and hardware communities
contributed to problems with the program development.
Essentially, nearly all the software DCs felt that they were
the in-house experts on software and that their talents were
not properly utilized. Additionally, most of the DCs were
openly contemptuous of outside contractors utilized by the PM
to augment either hardware or software development. Many
expressed frustration and felt they were constantly being
"shown up" by the lack of coordinated effort within the
program. The main complaint was that outside contractors were
utilized to pursue specific ideas without the coordination of
the critical program development divisions.
With respect to the implementation of reuse to their
specific program, by a wide margin, the DCs felt that reuse
would place an undue burden on their divisions within dubious
potential for payoff. Most felt reuse would be an added
burden in terms of time and manpower, and none felt that their
division would benefit by expanding the number of personnel
within the division. Only one had any real knowledge of the
DA and DoD efforts to develop and institute reuse into the
development cycle, but most distrusted higher levels of
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management to effectively develop and implement a broad based
software reuse program that might ease the PM level burden.
Software DCs presented a constant picture of frustration and
looked upon reuse in a decidedly negative light, counting it
as just one more problem to overcome.
Because of the potential impact of software reuse on
hardware architectures, hardware development division chiefs
were also interviewed. While most has some experience with
software, few were really current in the field, and none had
any knowledge of current reuse efforts. Once the program was
explained to the hardware DCs, the most common reaction was
for the DC to point out all the potential hardware development
problems implied by reuse. Essentially, all believed that
initiation of reuse would severely limit options available to
hardware developers. All of the hardware DCs felt that
software would become the dictation precedent with respect to
any development activities, whether upgrades or new product
developments. All of the DCs expressed dismay that hardware
development would be significantly retarded in order to
accommodate reusable software, and that hardware would take a
backseat to software. This obviously reflects a fear of
loosing substantial influence within the program development
domain.
The attitude that hardware is the program driver or
central focus of program development was confirmed in the
discussions with both the hardware and software division
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chiefs. While this is only relevant in embedded systems and
programs developing both hardware and software, it is the
predominate attitude in these programs. the hardware DCs
clearly understood they had more influence over the direction
of the program, while the software DCs clearly felt they were
often the victims of the hardware developers.
E. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
While most of those interviewed had hard and fast opinions
either supporting or condemning software reuse, all were
professional in their approach to their work. While some may
have had reservations about the implementation of reuse into
the development cycle, all admitted they would support
whatever program was put before them. All experienced
frustration at attempts to maintain currency with respect to
technological developments in their given field, whether
hardware or software development. And finally, nearly all
felt the next higher level of management held the key to
successful software reuse implementation, while simultaneously
condemning that very level of management for current program
shortcomings and problems.
As for the PMs, they held the unanimous opinion that any
PM selected for an automation program, whether hardware or
software, needed a technical background either in electrical
engineering, computer engineering, or at the very least,
computer science. Most felt that taking over a program
already under development as opposed to start-up, locked the
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PM into an unalterable course of action. the consensus was
that once the program reached a certain level of effort, any
opportunity to altar the basic direction of the program was
lost. For example, if a software development program was
experiencing difficulty after spending significant amounts of
money, little recourse was available to the PM except to spend
even more money to fix the problems. Starting over or
scrapping a portion of the program were not considered to be
viable options by the PMs. And finally, without exception,
all of those interviewed felt that for any software reuse
program to be successful and effective, it would need to be
top driven, administered at DA or DoD level, and controlled
locally at the PEO level.
F. SUMMARY
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, human
nature and resistance to change form an nearly impenetrable
wall that may well be considered a tangible reuse inhibitor
within the program office (in the same sense that the
inhibitors described in Chapter III are tangible) . The case
could be made that this is essentially another category of
inhibitor, populated by the collective fears, doubts,
mistrust, and abject pessimism of those tasked to implement
software reuse at the program management level . This was
readily demonstrated by the numerous negative responses
elicited from program management personnel with respect to
implementation of reuse into their programs.
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Regardless of rank or position within the program
structure, all those interviewed believed that the PM had the
greatest potential impact (with respect to implementation of
software reuse) on software development, but was the least
technically competent to affect critical program changes.
Everyone interviewed also believed that software reuse would
increase the already overwhelming workload without increasing
the available program manpower. The bottom line, repeated at
every level of management, was that software reuse will
substantially increase program risk. Without exception, all
those interviewed were admittedly risk averse. Consequently,
it comes as no surprise that there is a stone wall of human
emotion which must be breached before software reuse can
become a reality.
To effectively overcome this obstacle, it will be
necessary for the DoD and DA to address the previously
categorized reuse inhibitors and barriers. Admittedly,
elimination of these inhibitors alone will not automatically
open the doors to reuse to reuse acceptance, however, it will
serve to augment the intense education effort that must be
implemented to overcome the human aspect of the problem.
Because these inhibitors form the foundation of the human
trepidation about reuse, efforts to overcome these issues will
also work to break down the human resistance to change.
Therefore, the key to initiation of the reuse effort must lie
in solving the problems described in Chapter III.
93
V. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters have examined the systemic problems
in implementing software reuse into the program software
development process and the effectiveness of the Program
Manager in influencing the infusion or omission of reuse in
software development. Although these problems are wide
ranging and seemingly all encompassing, they are not
insurmountable. This chapter will attempt to address some of
these problems and inhibitors with potential solutions.
First, possible solutions to some of the systemic inhibitors
presented in Chapter III are examined.
B. SOLUTIONS
1 . Standards
a. The DoD should sponsor an effort to standardize
software requirements, metrics, notation, and design method-
ologies . This would serve a two-fold purpose. First,
standardization within the DoD would reduce program develop-
ment cost. Cost savings would be realized not only through
the potential implementation of software reuse, but through
the reduction of effort involved in determining program
requirements, measuring and comparing software effectiveness,
and developing the required software through the use of
standardized methodologies. Second, standardization will
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reduce the time necessary for development of software
components. Standardization of development methodologies,
especially those which can be integrated with or imposed on
contractors' current methods will streamline the software
development process and allow a greater degree of control to
be exercised by the PM. Implementation of reuse, made
possible through widespread standardization, will enhance the
process and further reduce development times by allowing
earlier integration start times. The PM's control of the
program will be strengthened by allowing him to refer to
previously completed programs to foresee potential problems
and solutions as-well -as established time lines to measure
program schedule effectiveness. And, in a situation where
program development time is tied directly to cost, shorter
development time and fewer delays will further reduce
expenditures. Additional benefits which may be realized
through standardization would be the potential for more
competitors for DoD software development contracts, should the
DoD standard also receive widespread acceptance as the
commercial standard. Such a proliferation of standardized
methodologies, notations, and metrics could conceivably
increase contractor competition, further reducing costs and
improving the final product.
Although the initial investment in this effort
would be expensive, the potential returns are immeasurable.
As a practical approach, standardization should probably be
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implemented through IEEE or ISO standards/specifications.
[Ref. 38:p. 21]
b. Small teams should be formed to develop initial
architecture and interface standards/specifications for
specific domains . These teams should also establish methods
for updating and disseminating standards more quickly and
efficiently. Standardization of software architectures would
greatly reduce the number of variant systems currently being
utilized or developed and would allow greater utilization of
reuse through more commonality of software systems. Architec-
tures developed for specific domains could be developed across
the various military Services and used to expand potentially
reusable software resources by enlarging the domain envelop —
such as anti-aircraft missile technology which has application
across all Services with such things as targeting and tracking
software. Expanded domain architectures could easily provide
exponential growth in lines of reusable code, and open up
opportunities to utilize technology advances once realized
only by individual Services.
c. Update the standardized SEI Software Development
Process models to include software reuse . Adding software
reuse to the model templates would provide a convenient guide
to the time and method of inclusion of software reuse into the
software development process. Such standardized templates
would also serve to heighten awareness of software reuse.
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Coordinated with the introduction of a reuse
template should be the inclusion of software reuse into the
software engineering life cycle. As described in chapter III,
the software life cycle should provide ample opportunity to
implement reuse at nearly every phase of the software life
cycle. In order to obtain maximum effectiveness, it is
critical that software reuse be integrated during the entire
life cycle and not just during the development phase. The
greater the focus on reuse, the wider the application and
greater the potential for overall benefit.
d. Finally, once reuse has been addressed within the
DoD. performance criteria for suppliers. distributors,
maintainers based on use and customer satisfaction must be
established . Without the support and full cooperation of the
contractor side of the software development business, any DoD
effort to implement reuse will be an exercise in futility.
Not only must DoD standards for reuse implementa-
tion be exported to the civilian software development
community (primarily the contractors/ developers who are
normally employed to develop DoD software) but acceptance of
and conformity to these standards must also be utilized as
criteria for contract award and measuring program progress.
2. Training and Education
a. The DoD must implement an extensive and intense
training effort for DoD personnel in reuse techniques and
utilization of available resources . Reuse methodologies and
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techniques must be conveyed to those responsible for software
development through the various curricula available through
many of the DoD schools, organizations, and correspondence
courses. Reuse training material should receive wide-spread
dissemination while add-on correspondence courses in reuse
technology and management must be made available and mandatory
for Program Managers.
b. A reuse infrastructure must be established within
the DoD . Essentially, a mechanism for sharing information and
disseminating the latest technologies and methodologies must
be developed to reach all aspects of software development and
management. This infrastructure should include an annual
software reuse symposium or conference and some form of
newsletter to transmit information such as lessons learned,
cost savings for programs, success stories, and legal issues
concerning such things as licensing fees and restrictions.
Such measures would serve to link the entire DoD software
development effort, providing all developers and managers with
a standardized and acceptable method for passing the most
current and critical information in a timely and efficient
manner.
c. The general awareness of the development community
must be heightened with regard to reuse libraries and deposi-
tories , the user/development community must be provided with
listings of available libraries, contents, cataloging systems,
methods of utilization, and knowledgeable points of contact.
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All the plans, libraries, depositories and
regulations of the DoD cannot foster the integration of
software reuse unless the developers are aware of the
resources at hand. Only through a concerted effort to educate
the PMs and their staffs on multiple levels and a host of
reuse subjects can the DoD hope to implement widespread
software reuse within the acquisition community.
3 • Management
a. An effort should be made at the highest levels of
DoD and industry to define and develop appropriate financial
incentives and other promotionals for the production and use
of quality reuse assets . It is clear that an undertaking of
this magnitude will necessitate the best effort from both
sides of the acquisition process. Because of the vast
potential area of impact, high level representatives from all
of the military Services, as-well-as NASA and other concerned
agencies within the Government need to meet with industry
leaders in software development and production as-well-as
hardware producers to decide on the appropriate and most
influential incentives for implementing reuse on a broad and
standardized front. Current level of difficulty in
instituting software reuse, combined with dubious returns,
makes the use of incentives to inspire reuse all the more
important. These incentives must appeal to the Program
Manager and his staff as-well-as the commercial contractor and
his developers. Participation by all of the interested or
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concerned parties will be required in order to develop
equitable yet inspirational incentives for utilizing software
reuse. These incentives must apply not only to those who
utilize reusable code, but those responsible for developing
code intended to be reused, and hardware developers who must
readily utilize open architectures which readily accept
reusable software. Consequently, these incentives must be
linked and dependent upon one another to be effective in
encouraging reuse on a scale broad enough to impact all
DoD/Government development efforts.
b. The standard development templates utilized in the
acquisition process for software development must be revised
to include reuse plans and strategies within the acquisition
process . The establishment of a specific review process to
determine the validity of inclusion of reuse in a program's
development must be included in the acquisition approval
process. This process should consist of incorporating
specific approval points within the acquisition cycle which
can only be passed after considering the pros and cons of
including reuse into the program. It is imperative that such
a program establish specific criteria which will force the PM
to investigate and consider the potential for including
software reuse into the program development.
c. A concerted effort must be made at the Service
Acquisition Executive level or above to provide financial and
technical support to PEOs and PMs for reuse initiatives .
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[Ref. 38 :p. 29] Any effort to push software reuse must be
endorsed by and pushed from the top down.
This is probably best accomplished through the
preparation and presentation of a business case to the Service
Acquisition Executives to highlight the Service-wide
advantages of implementing a reuse strategy for system
acquisition. The case should identify potential domain areas
for application of the proposed strategy, long-term (5 to 10
years) benefits to the various Services, and initiatives that
are currently proceeding within each individual Service.
Critical to the success of this effort should be the
demonstration of the need for additional support (technical,
financial, and moral) to the PEOs and PMs during the start-up
phase of any reuse approach. It should be shown that
relatively small amounts of money can make the difference
between success and failure for the initiation of a reuse
program, and that this money should be used to support the
initial set-up and maintenance costs for library capability,
the definition of common requirements and domain-specific
architectures, and the additional development costs of
reusable assets to support implementation. [Ref. 38 :p. 20]
d. Finally, a DoD evaluation of current programs
should be performed to collect data on all maior programs
incorporating reuse . These programs should be examined to
determine "what works and what doesn't" with respect to
implementing reuse into development efforts. This examination
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would provide valuable information to other efforts such as
the area of requirements and domain standardization. This
could also open the development process to incorporation of an
evaluation system of program performance that would include
software reuse. Such an evaluation should examine the PM's
conformance with the reuse plan, accomplishment of reuse
goals, effective use of tools, and identification and
resolution of problems in reuse.
4 . Libraries
a. The neglect that current software libraries have
suffered must be corrected bv developing library standards,
interface specifications. certification and acceptance
criteria. library network interconnections. library
interoperability, and configuration management . This will
require close coordination with program/project offices to
determine actual requirements, test ease of utilization,
availability and access, and to develop quality assets.
Again, this needs to be both a multi-Service and multi-domain
project to prevent repetition of the poorly regulated,
disjointed and generally neglected system currently in place.
b. Utilizing the information gathered in the process
described above, domain specific libraries should be developed
and populated . These libraries must be cross-Service, open
architecture facilities, with logically conceived cataloging
systems to provide easy access to domain specific and
relatively risk free software to development projects.
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Drawing on the PM experience and expertise in the development
process, libraries should become considerably more valuable as
a development resource. [Ref. 38 :p. 24]
5. Legal and Contractual Issues
a. Of critical importance to any reuse effort will be
the establishment of a mechanism for removing barriers for
software development companies to legally utilize software
produced from other software development companies . Current
restrictions on utilization of proprietary software and
architectures must be breached and equitable guidelines
established to facilitate fair compensation for use of
reusable code by other developers. Areas which must be
addressed range from liability assessment for DoD programs
damaged or delayed by reusing poor quality software, to
responsibility for maintenance and upgrade of software
cacheted in libraries, to royalties for the initial reuse of
software and subsequent utilization of programs containing
reused software developed by a second party.
b. Changes in the legal parameters of the acguisition
process, allowing financial incentives based on performance
criteria for implementation of reuse, should be developed and
instituted for suppliers, developers, and maintainers . This
approach should include contractor clauses to support reuse
and evaluation criteria for RFPs. With reductions in DoD
acquisition expenditures driving reductions in the number of
firms willing to compete for defense contracts, financial
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incentives may prove the necessary enticement to keep current
contractors interested and bring new competitors into business
with the DoD while simultaneously integrating software reuse
into the development process. This would provide not only
incentive to reuse software, but allow contractors to collect
repeatedly for development efforts utilizing previously
developed software.
C. LEVELS OF EXPERTISE AND KNOWLEDGE
Finally, that prevalent yet intangible human element
which enters into and impacts the daily business of weapon
system development must be addressed. Each level of effort
within the development process (division, product, program)
must be addressed. The level of knowledge required by the
hardware or software division chief and his personnel is much
greater and more detailed than the technical expertise
required at the PM and DPM level. Because of these differing
requirements for education and information at the various
levels, efforts to address the "human factor" must be tailored
to the specific area of effort. Any effort to dispel the
disbelief or skepticism held by those involved in software
development must be dealt with on a level which will
specifically address those particular problems and ideas.
The DoD must apply a broad-based education program to all
levels of effort involved in program development. The lowest
level needing attention is at the division level within each
PM office. This is the most technical level and accordingly
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will require the most in-depth and detailed effort. The PM
and DPM levels, being more management oriented, will not
require such formal or detailed education in the actual
mechanics of reuse. However, at the PEO level, the
educational process must encompass everything from the broad-
based overview to the detailed functional mechanics of reuse.
This educational effort must be both formal and informal.
Formal classes must be given at all levels to educate
development and management personnel on software development
models and templates. These classes must be focused on
specific levels of program development operations, depending
on the particular audience. This instruction must include
identification of the opportunity points in the development
process to initiate or institute software reuse and the
methods required to import reusable software into the target
program. Course material must also cover procedures to
implement thorough documentation techniques to facilitate
integrating new code into software libraries. The education
process must also include overviews of programs sharing
particular weapon system application domains. These domains
must include both inter- and intra- Service applications in
order to maximize the benefit of reuse. Again, the level of
detail and complexity must be tailored to the audience and its
part in the development process.
Informal working groups, update and refresher sessions,
and in-house seminars must be conducted on a regular basis.
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These informal tools should cover the development and release
of new reuse tools and templates within the DoD. Such a forum
would also serve as a vehicle to pass information about
concurrent development efforts which may have reuse
application or affect software development in other programs.
This is also the ideal mechanism to promote the reuse library
system by regularly disseminating information on newly annexed
code modules and documentation.
As mentioned above, the focus at the PEO level must cover
the gamut of instruction, from general overview to detailed
software reuse implementation procedures. The Program
Executive Office level of operation is critical to the
successful execution of any reuse program, regardless of the
level of application. The PEO must serve as the integrator of
reusable software into subordinate program domains and as the
primary point of contact for software development with other
PEOs. The PEO should also exercise executive control over
reuse efforts within the specific program domains in order to
pass critical development information in a timely manner and
provide additional expertise to the PMs when necessary.
D. SUMMARY
Overall, the effort to implement software reuse on a scale
that will produce acceptable returns on investment and
productivity must be pushed on many fronts and at many levels.
It should be apparent that most of the inhibitors and barriers
can and must be assaulted simultaneously. Because so many of
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them are linked together, often crossing numerous category
boundaries in scope and impact, any effort to address one
barrier or inhibitor may simultaneously affect another. The
obvious danger is advertently creating more problems in
associated or related areas through the application of faulty
solutions or poor execution of good solutions. Consequently,
all efforts to overcome these problems must be closely
coordinated and controlled.
The solutions offered above are only some of the actions
necessary to initiate reuse at the DoD level. These solutions
range from the esoteric and technical, to the simplistic and
comm sensical. Obviously, there are far more approaches to
the problem than can be described here. However, all attempts
at overcoming these barriers will have an impact, either
positive or negative, on the Army wide implementation of
software reuse. As these plans are implemented, other courses
of action will become evident and further solutions will
present themselves. Only time will tell which of these
efforts will be successful and which will be shunted into
obscurity. But one thing is clear, the first step must be to
convince those responsible for software development that reuse
is the key to future program success. The more for less
military is now a reality. Excuses for inefficiency can no
longer be tolerated, the cost in terms of time, money, and
successfully fielded systems is just too high.
107
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
It should be obvious by now that the U.S. Army has begun
to address the multitude of problems associated with the
development of software for automated weapon systems. Facing
a staggering demand for sophisticated, highly automated weapon
systems requiring greater productivity from the limited and
available software-producing resources, and facing severely
shrinking defense expenditures, the military has been forced
to relook its efforts to meet these needs. The different
Services have pursued or are pursuing various individual and
joint solutions to the imminent software shortage. However,
of the currently available technologies and methodologies
available to attack this problem, the method with the greatest
potential return of investment is software reuse.
B. THE WORK AT HAND
The Department of Defense has embarked on a host of
different programs to explore this option, with the Army
taking the lead on several. In response to pressure from
Congress, the overall lead for the Army effort has been tasked
to the Army Software Reuse Council and Working Group. Leading
the Army's effort in applying software reuse are the RAPID
software library program and the AFATDS and ATCCS
software/hardware development programs.
108
This Reuse Working Group is attempting to consolidate the
entire Army software reuse effort in order to capitalize on
economies of scale offered by a widespread program and the
obvious advantages of utilizing multiple domains and their
potential contributions and applications. Current Army reuse
efforts are focused on laying the foundation or ground-work
infrastructure to employ reuse on a Service-wide basis once
all the component management and resourcing assets are in
place.
The current plan requires that the Army implement the
following functions:
1. Specify currently existing domains within the Army and
identify criteria necessary to prioritize, select and




Define potential reuse products within these selected
domains, to include domain analysis output and software
components generated by the development life cycle, as-
well-as component validation criteria for new applica-
tions [Ref. 39:p. 3].
3 Determine ownership criteria for new and reused
components [Ref. 39:p. 3].
4 Implement changes in the current acquisition process to
provide for the consideration and evaluation of reuse
during the entire acquisition life cycle [Ref. 39 :p.
3].
5. Consider and evaluate proposed deviations from the
development process to integrate and utilize reusable
components during each phase of the development life
cycle [Ref. 39:p. 3].
6. Define and develop models as guides to business
decisions related to reuse implementation [Ref. 39:p.
3].
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7. Define reuse metrics and establish guidelines and
procedures to govern collection and analysis of
pertinent data [Ref. 39:pp. 3-4],
8. Define component standards and guidelines to describe
characteristics and evaluation criteria necessary for
reuse component certification and inclusion in reuse
libraries [Ref. 39:p. 4],
9. Specify a technology base investment strategy to
recognize likely technologies, designate and track
reuse-related research and development efforts, and
identify appropriate means of transitioning these
efforts into actual practice [Ref. 39:p. 4].
10. Describe necessary training and education to impact all
levels of development decision making and influence
both the internal and external environment to
facilitate reuse [Ref. 39:p. 4].
11. Identify existing products and services for potential
reuse exploitation [Ref. 39:p. 4].
12. Finally, monitor, assist, contribute to , and extract
lessons learned from concurrent software reuse efforts
by other organizations both inside and outside the
Government [Ref. 39:p. 4].
C. OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS
These steps are necessary to overcome the myriad barriers
and inhibitors which currently frustrate wide-spread Army
implementation of software reuse. These barriers are
generally catalogued into five broad categories. First, and
maybe most far reaching, is the lack of standards in both the
hardware and software development processes, associated
development tools (metrics) , and architectures. The second
category is poor or inadequate training and education for
those most able to influence software development decision
making. No less important, is the third category, management.
The lack of adequate reuse incentives for both the decision-
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maker as well as the contractor, a situation compounded by
lack of trade-off mechanisms, cost models, experience, and
vision provide new frontiers and challenges in software
development management. The fourth category, and possibly the
one of greatest immediate impact to the implementation (or
lack thereof) of reuse, is the lack of any centralized catalog
of assets. The lack of adequate and logically cataloged
resources, plus inefficient means of surveying and retrieving
the currently available resources, has prevented any
substantial attempt at reuse. The last category is probably
the most restrictive of the five. The fifth category is that
engaging the morass of legal and contractual issues associated
with patents, copyrights, and proprietary data rights.
Because of the complex issues and economic implications
involved in this category, it is ripe for long term dispute,
arbitration, and litigation, and may prove to be the most
difficult to competently and conclusively overcome.
Although these reuse barriers and inhibitors are
classified into five separate categories, all are related and
generally bear influence on the others. Any attempt to
overcome or solve any particular problem in one category will
necessarily cross into another category. Obviously, simple
answers or solutions will not be adequate to thwart these
barriers. Only bold, forceful, deliberate action to implement
reuse will prove successful against these overwhelming
impediments.
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Faced with these seemingly insurmountable obstacles, the
Program Managers, as a group, have rejected the prospect of
voluntarily integrating software reuse into the
software/hardware development process. But, most PMs, being
military officers, admitted they would "soldier on" with reuse
if necessary. The consensus of those interviewed was that
reuse should not be applied to current programs, but should be
a "ground-up" proposition for new programs. All personnel
interviewed believed that software reuse will become a reality
within the Army in the near term. Those within the program
office, from PMs to DCs, believed also, that PMs should have
sufficient technical background in software and/or hardware to
be able to work competently with incoming reuse technologies.
Many of those interviewed were skeptical of the technical
skills displayed by more than a few of the currently serving
PMs.
Finally, all those interviewed believed that implementa-
tion of software reuse could only become a reality if the
program were top driven. Everyone suggested that essential
aspects of reuse implementation, such as reuse library
service, software porting studies, and reuse administration
and documentation, be at a sufficiently high level to span all
potential contributing sources within the Army (and/or the
DoD) . Those interviewed recommended that whatever organiza-
tion the Army develops to provide overall operational control
of software reuse, it must be able to tie related PMs
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together, or at least be able to interface with the PEOs and
integrate outside resources and information into subordinate
programs
.
As stated before, the human element is the most deep-
seated barrier facing software reuse implementation. The
resistance to change is a powerful, institutionalized force
and will be difficult to overcome. Only through the liberal
application of time and education can this inhibitor be
eliminated.
Both technical and human barriers must be overcome to
successfully implement this program at either the Army or DoD
level. Human resistance will be conquered through education.
The technical barriers, however, will be overcome only through
a concerted, systemic effort on a broad front. The most
promising approach to implementing reuse is an Army/DoD
multilevel program currently being launched. The program
consists of implementing several initiatives spanning
standardization, education and training, management,
libraries, and legal and contractual issues. These
initiatives seek to integrate new and emerging technologies
with tools, methodologies, and templates currently being
utilized in software development. The Army and DoD are
working jointly to take advantage of lessons learned through
multiple software reuse efforts and experiments. Networks are
being established to disseminate reuse information among
interested organizations in all military Services and selected
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Government organizations. And, possibly most important,
serious reform of the acquisition process with respect to
software and automated hardware development, is currently
being reviewed and revised. This acquisition review includes
mandatory consideration and, in some cases, inclusion in all
software acquisition and development programs and some
hardware development programs.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
A great deal of attention has been placed on the
organization necessary to facilitate software reuse. A
program without a strong and effective organizational
structure has no hope of success. All parties involved in
program management, software development, and software reuse
agree that this organization must have the following
characteristics
:
1. It must be either a DoD level organization to ensure it
is powerful enough to impose directives and controls on
subordinate developmental organizations and programs, or
it must be such that it is a separate organization
mirrored within all military services, tied through
administrative channels to pass information, development
techniques, and program progress.
2. The organizations must oversee all aspects of software
development, from software repositories and libraries,
to template and model development and dissemination, to
administrative and regulatory management of software
development and acquisition.
3. It must serve to link each particular program with each
of the other programs of similar domain or software
requirements, or at least link the governing PEOs of the
affected programs.
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4. It must bear some of the decision making responsibility
for source selection, development strategy, and program
technical reviews.
5. And finally, it must be adequately funded to ensure
sufficient resources and organizational clout to affect
the direction of development programs in all effected
areas.
The wheels of change are currently turning with respect to
the creation of such an organization. It can only be hoped
that this organization can benefit from the synergy resulting
from the interaction of the strategic issues mentioned herein.
The synergistic effect should ultimately reduce the time
required to field critical systems, improve quality, and
reduce costs and risk associated with software-intensive
systems [Ref. 39:p. 4].
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The issues, organizations, solutions and models mentioned
here are not in themselves sufficient to overcome the time and
expense necessary to bring a sophisticated, automated weapon
system to successful production and field implementation. A
great deal of further study is needed. Even as the aforemen-
tioned solutions are being implemented and controlling
organizations formed, more questions are being raised and new
reuse inhibitors are being discovered. During the course of
this research, several related problems were uncovered. The
following areas offer opportunities for further study and will
necessarily need to be addressed in the course of Army
software reuse implementation.
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1. Examine potential software repository standardization
and structure, to include domain classification,
retrieval and donation systems, with the object of
arriving at an optimal organizational and administrative
structure
.
2. Examine potential organizational structures and program
interface mechanisms for a DoD level or Service level
software reuse advocate/control organization to oversee
implementation of software development and reuse across
a broad spectrum of applications and domains.
3
.
Explore recent and potential improvements in software
development templates and models utilizing the latest
software reuse technologies.
4. Examine the contractor's managerial problems,
inhibitors, and barriers in developing and implementing
software reuse, and potential Government incentives
which could be offered to contractors to overcome these
barriers.
5. Examine current DoD and Army software development and
acquisition policy for potentially advantageous changes
which might incorporate or implement software reuse as
part of the program development and review process.
6. A thorough examination should be conducted to study the
legal inhibitors and barriers from both the Government
and contractor perspectives, with an objective to find
legal work-arounds which will foster greater contractor
participation in developing and utilizing reusable
software.
While these offered areas of further study a certainly not
a complete list of potential subjects, it does cover some of
the more difficult, non-technical issues which must be
overcome before the DoD is able to successfully implement
software reuse on a scale that will provide economic dividends
for the developing agency. Much work remains to be done,
especially in the area of convincing those most responsible
for developing and utilizing reusable software that it is a
worthwhile idea. However, even as the program is being
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inaugurated at the DA level, work continues at all levels to




The following questions were asked of selected Army
Program Managers as a means of acquiring information for this
thesis. Cooperative responses to initial questionnaires were
given a second, follow-up questionnaire, or in some instances,
visited by the author to interview the PM and his staff. The
second questionnaire was targeted at not only the Program
Manager, but the DPM and the subordinate program Division
Chiefs in an attempt to get a more well-rounded picture of PM
operations.
A. Initial Questionnaire
1. Does your project require software development or
acquisition as part of the program?
2. Is a significant amount of your program budget and
time devoted to software development issues? If so, ho much?
3. Is your project software developmental or is it an
upgrade of currently utilized or existing software?
4. Does your system software share utilization with any
other system under development or currently in the field?
5. Does your system software have potential to be
utilized by other systems?
6. Do you know of any other system currently being
developed or already fielded which might have software that
could be utilized by your system?
7. Does your project office engage in any form of joint
software development effort with any other project?
8. Is there any exchange of information concerning
software problems and development with projects and programs
either inside or outside your own PEO structure?
9. Has your project software development affected the
cost or schedule of your program?
10. Are you familiar with the current effort by DoD to
initiate a Software Reuse Program?
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11. Would your project software development benefit from
a centralized library of existing programming and cataloging
of developmental efforts?
12. Do you think future programs would benefit from such
a centralized library?
B. Follow-up Questionnaire
The intended target of any particular question is given in
parenthesis before each question. In some instances, the
questions are the same as those found in Questionnaire One,
but are intended to illicit information from different
individuals within the PM office. Those interviewed or
surveyed included Program Managers, Deputy Program Managers,
Hardware and Software Development and Management Division
Chiefs, and in some cases, technical specialists.
Although the initial questionnaire was intended to be
answered by the PM, in some instances, the DPM responded.
Consequently, some of the follow-up questions are intended to
be answered by either the PM or DPM, depending on who
responded to the initial questionnaire.
1. (PM/DPM) How much control do you exercise on a daily
basis within your organization concerning software develop-
ment?
2. (All) What is your background with respect to
hardware and software technology, engineering, and development
methodologies?
3. (PM/DPM) How competent are your subordinates (Deputy
PM, Division Chiefs, etc.) with respect to software and
hardware development and the latest emerging technologies,
including software reuse?
4. (All) How open are you lines of communication inside
your organization?
5. (All) How open are your lines of communication to
organizations outside your program, such as the PEO, other
programs within the PEO, and programs outside the PEO?
6. (DC) How knowledgeable are the PM and DPM in matters
of software/hardware development and emerging technologies
such as reuse?
7. (DC) How much direct control or influence does the
PM/DPM exercise over your division and its efforts on a daily
basis?
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8. (All) Does your system software share utilization
with any other system under development or currently in the
field?
9. (All) Does your system software have potential to be
utilized by other systems?
10. (All) Do you know of any other system currently being
developed or already fielded which might have software that
could be utilized by your system?
11. (All) Are you familiar with the current effort by DoD
to initiate a Software Reuse Program?
12. (All) Would your project software development benefit
from a centralized library of existing programming and
cataloging of developmental efforts?
13. (All) Do you think future programs would benefit from





A comprehensive, Pascal-based programming language developed
for the DoD to implement both business applications and
embedded applications (such as rocket guidance systems)
.
Application Software
Higher order language programs that can perform specific,
user-oriented tasks.
Architecture
A structural concept for a complex software application and




Computer languages that allow the use of mnemonic names for
machine language instructions and operands in the place of
the binary machine codes.
Automated Weapon System
Weapon system utilizing and/or incorporating digital
information system (s) as an integral part of either the
actual weapon or its command and control element or both.
The computer hardware and software in an automated weapon
system perform such tasks as input/output control , system
diagnostic functions, and program function execution such as
acquiring, tracking, and closing on designated targets.
Bit
A unit of information storage capacity, as either of the
binary digits or 1 in a computer memory. [B(inary) (dig) IT]
Critical Path
The longest path through a project from beginning to end.
It includes all the activities that, if delayed, would stall
the project's completion.
Do Loop
A program execution command used o implement repetitive
operations within an executable function.
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Domain
A specific phase or area of the software life cycle in which
a developer works. Domains define developers and users
areas of responsibility and the scope of possible
relationships between products.
Domain Analysis
The process of identifying the preliminary requirements for
software parts to fill common needs of a selected
application domain through an intensive examination of
applicable architectures. The process consists of
developing a preliminary model and classification scheme for
the domain and refining the model and identifying common
objects, structures and function which are candidates for
reusable software parts.
Embedded Computer System
A computer system as an integral part of a larger system
such as a weapon system or communication system which cannot
be separated or deconstructed into functional component
parts without degrading or incapacitating the system
capabilities.
Granularity (of software components)
Granularity refers to the number and size of software
modules or sub-components which compose the varying parts of
a software program. Essentially, the smaller the modules
and their component parts, the greater the software
granularity.
Hardwired
An industry term referring to hardware solutions to software
application problems. Essentially, this term refers to
physical work-arounds through electronic engineering
applications utilized where software solutions are not
practical or possible.
Higher Order Languages
Computer programming languages utilizing statements which
typically resemble mathematical formulas or English
expressions much more than assembly language commands.
Examples of HOLs include FORTRAN, COBAL, CMS-2, and Ada.
Instruction Set Architecture
The internal and fixed repertoire of instructions that




The stages and processes through which software passes
during its development. This includes requirements
definition, analysis, design, coding, testing, and
maintenance.
Machine Language
The binary codes which are understood directly by the
computer hardware.
Metrics
Quantitative analysis values calculated according to a
precise definition and used to establish comparative aspects
of development progress, quality assessment or choice of
options.
Mnemonic
A symbolic name used in a computer program rather than an
actual numeric address.
Operand
A field specifying where in the computer the data for a
particular operation or function is located.
Software
The combination of computer programs and documentation
needed to cause computer hardware to perform a certain task
or tasks.
Software Bindings
A software component that provides an application with a
means to access other software written in a language
different from that of the application.
Software Component
This refers to named modules of reusable information that
can be manipulated by a target reuser. Software components
may be further decomposed into other components and software
units.
Software Module
The discrete components of a software program. Each module
is separate and distinct from other modules such that a




A software system element with State, Behavior, and




A piece of data resulting from some phase of the software
life cycle. Examples include: executable code, a
requirement specification, an interface specification, and
a data flow graph design. A software part can be catalogued
as a collection or hierarchy of smaller parts.
Software Portability
The ease with which software can be transferred from one
computer system or environment to another.
Software Reuse Technologies
Technologies, tools, and programs developed to foster
software reuse. These are generally innovative, leading




The portion of a software program that is lost or damaged or
does not readily present itself to software porting.
Software Unit
Any logical set or groupings of instructions to a computer,
such as a module or package.
Taxonomy




ADAS Architecture Design and Assessment System
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AR Army Regulation
ASSET Asset Source for Software Engineering Techniques
ATCCS Army Tactical Command and Control System
BFA Battlefield Functional Area
CAMP Common Ada Missile Packages
CARDS Central Archive for Reusable Defense Software
CASE Computer-Aided Software Engineering
CECOM Communications-Electronics Command
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf
DA Department of the Army
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DC Division Chief
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DoD Department of Defense
DOS Disk Operating System
DPM Deputy Program/Project/Product Manager
DSMC Defense Systems Management College
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation
FY Fiscal Year
GOTS Government Off-The-Shelf
HOL Higher Order Language
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IDA Institute for Defense Analyses
JIAWG Joint Integrated Avionics Working Group
JLC Joint Logistics Commanders
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NDI Non-Developmental Item
NSIA National Security Industrial Association
PDSS Post Development Software Support
PEO Program Executive Officer
PM Program/Project/Product Manager
RAPID Reusable Ada Products for Information System
Development
SCSI Small Computer Systems Interface
SEI Software Engineering Institute
SLOC Software Lines of Code / Source Lines of Code
STARS Software Technology for Adaptable, Reliable Systems
VHSIC Very High Speed Integrated Circuit
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